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This study seeks to analyze the
resurgence in popularity of regional
economic integration schemes in the Third
World. In the last few years, a plethora of
new economic integration efforts among
developing countries have been proposed,
including the Southern Cone Common
Market (Mercosur), the ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement, and the Group of Three.
Attempts are also being made to revive a
number of pre-existing organizations,
including the Caribbean Common Market
(CAR1COM), the Central American
Common Market (CACM), and the
Andean Pact. In addition, a number of
economic integration proposals have been
advanced which comprise both developing
and industrialized countries, namely the
North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the East Asian Economic Caucus
(EAEC) and the Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative (EAI).
Economic integration is not a new
phenomenon in the Third World, as
substantial efforts were made during the
1960s and 1970s towards establishing
regional markets. Understanding the basic
elements of these previous integration
experiences is essential, as it aids in
assessing the future effectiveness of
current developing country integration
efforts. Consequently, the first half of the
study is a historical analysis of Third
World economic integration schemes that
were attempted in the 1960s and 1970s.
Section one provides a brief outline of the
underlying motivational factors which led
to integration proposals during this period.
The second section describes underlying
structure of the eight most significant
developing country trade pacts of that
period. Because none of these eight
integration schemes were able to achieve
significant gains, section three then seeks
to detail the factors which led to their
failure in order to determine their common
structural deficiencies.
The second half of the paper deals
with the ascendance of economic
integration among Third World countries
in the 1990s. Section four articulates the
new rationale that exists for economic
integration among developing countries.
The drive towards economic integration in
the Third World is analyzed in terms of
being both a defensive reaction to the rise
of regionalism in the industrialized world
as well as an attempt to move away from
inward-oriented development strategies.
Section five then presents a short
description of the Third World integration
schemes that have emerged in the 1990s.
The final section uses the evaluative
framework that was developed in section
three in order to test the efficacy of the two
most advanced integration schemes of the
1990s: Mercosur and the ASEAN Free
Trade Agreement. The structures of these
two agreements are assessed in order to
see whether they have avoided the




Integration in the 1960s and
1970s
The roots of regional economic
integration efforts in the Third World are
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intimately related to the quest for
economic development. Economic
integration came to be seen as an
important element of the Third World's
development strategy largely because of
the way the region viewed the
international economic system during the
1960s and 1970s. At this time, the
international economy was seen as having
been disadvantageously constructed to the
interests of the Third World. As will be
seen, this world view resulted in the
adoption of a particular approach to
development, namely import substitution,
which precipitated the need for regional
economic integration.
In 1950, Raul Prebisch brought
forth the influential theory of declining
terms of trade faced by the Third World.
Prebisch's theory posited that the
international economic system was set up
in such a way that industrialized countries,
the "Center", were becoming steadily richer
while countries in the Third World, the
"Periphery", were growing gradually
poorer.! Prebisch maintained that exports
from the Third to the industrialized
countries were gradually being reduced in
price while Third World imports from
industrialized countries were becoming
steadily more expensive. Such a pattern of
trade was seen as the result of colonial
trade patterns set up to supply the
industrialized countries with raw materials
while using the Third World as a market
for finished products.^ Prebisch argued
that the industrialized world's demand for
raw materials had a long-term downward
tendency, due to both low income-
elasticity demand for raw materials and
the development of synthetics.^ He also
contended that "the benefits of
technological process in the industrialized
world went to higher wages and profits
rather than into lower prices."^
The Third World's limited
economic power relative to the
industrialized countries made it impossible
to restructure the international economic
system more advantageously through
negotiations.5 As long as the Third World
remained part of this exploitative
international system, it was argued that the
gap between rich and poor would continue
to widen. In order to be able to develop,
there was general consensus throughout
the Third World that policies would need
to be implemented to promote domestic
industries. Most economic policy makers
felt that the patterns of trade that Prebisch
described were merely a reflection of
comparative advantages that had been
artificially imposed by colonialism."
Comparative advantages were not seen as
unalterable, however, and various
Mos Santos, Theotonio. "Tine Structure of
Dependence." American Economic Review . Vol.
60, 1970, p. 231.
^Cardoso, Fernando and Enzo Faletto.
Dependency and Development in Latin
America . 1979. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
^Hirschmann, Albert. "Ideologies of
Development in Latin America", in Latin
American Issues: Essays and Comments . 1961.
New York: Twentieth Century Fund, p. 15.
^Mitchell, Christopher. The Role of Technocrats
in Latin American Integration . Inter-American
Economic Affairs, Summer 1967.
^Baer, Wener. Tine Economics of Prebisch and
ECLA . Economic Development and Cultural
Change, January 1962.
6Isbister, John. Promises Not Kept . 1990. Santa
Cruz: Merrill College, p.43.
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programs were consequently designed to
try and raise the competitive position of
Third World countries.
Import substitution was the central
policy that was adopted to reverse the
declining terms of trade, as the most
logical way seen to rectify the problem of
imports that were becoming steadily more
expensive was to have the domestic
economy produce those goods. Using
import substitution, it was believed that
developing countries could foster efficient
industries. The advocates of import
substitution knew, however, that there
would initially be substantial trade
diversion, the process whereby efficient
external suppliers are replaced by
inefficient, domestic ones. However, it
was felt that the inefficiency would only be
temporary. What was essential was that
embryonic industries be protected long
enough so that they could benefit from
'learning effects'. As learning effects
influenced the production process,
planners felt that inefficiencies would be
steadily reduced. Thus, it was felt that
while the cost of static (immediate) trade
diversion would high, that the cost of
dynamic (long-term) trade diversion
would be minimal. In fact, it was
eventually hoped that some of the
industries would become efficient to point
that they would have a comparative
advantage with the rest of the world,
thereby reversing the declining pattern of
trade.
The first phase of import
substitution achieved a number of
significant successes. The industries that
most developing countries initially
protected were ones they were not
significantly uncompetitive in, such as
basic consumer goods. These industries
were largely labor intensive, and were
therefore compatible with the factor
endowments of developing economies. In
addition, international competition during
this period was drastically reduced as a
result of the interruption of trade from
Europe due to World War II.
Consequently, these industries could
prosper under relatively low levels of
protection, which limited the drain on
public resources.^
Import substitution ran into
significant problems, however, during its
second phase when countries began to
protect industries other than labor-
intensive products. Severe inefficiencies
resulted when countries began to promote
industries that were more technologically
based, especially capital goods. The main
constraint on producing technological
goods was that domestic markets were too
small to set up plants that were large
enough to reap economies of scaled Even
large developing countries, such as Brazil,
had markets that were too limited to be
able to produce these goods efficiently."
Achieving economies of scale was
imperative, since the technology that was
used for these goods was designed to serve
very large production runs.^ Many of
' Baer, Wener. Import Substitution and
Industrialization in Latin America: Experiences
and Interpretations . Latin American Research
Review, Spring 1972
"Teitel, Simon. Economies of Scale and Size of
Flant: The Evidence and the Implications for
Developing Countries. Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol. 13, 1975
9Cardosand Faletto . p. 5
^'inter-American Development Bank. 1984.
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America:
Regional Economic Integration
these second phase industries were not
indigenous to the economies of the region,
which necessitated a reliance, at least
initially, on first world technology.
Without economies of scale, import
substitution would be extremely
ineffective, since the industries would
always be greatly inefficient.H Rather
than than promoting development, such
industries proved to be a huge drain on
countries' resources.
Because dependency theorists were
still ascendant at this time, there was a
great reluctance to abandon import
substitution. It was this effort to maintain
the policy of import substitution which led
to the plans for regional economic
integration that were enacted in the 1960s.
Regional economic integration seemed the
only means to achieve economies of scale,
while still continuing the policy of import
substitution.12 it was argued that by
aggregating a number of different
economies, there would be enough
consumers that producers would be able to




the 1960s and 1970s
In this second section, eight
attempts at Third World economic
integration that occurred during the 1960s
Economic Integration . Washington DC. Inter-
American Development Bank, p. 11.
n Teitel .
12lnter-American Development Bank , p. 16
and 1970s will be reviewed. These eight
treaties are only a partial list of integration
proposals, however, as there were literally
dozens of formal groupings that were
ratified during this period. Nevertheless,
only a subset of integration efforts require
reviewing. The purpose of this section is
not to understand the full range of
previous integration efforts, but instead
only those that can help to either explain or
evaluate current integration efforts that
have been initiated in the 1990s. There are
therefore two categories of Third World
integration efforts which will not be dealt
with in this paper.
The first category that will not be
reviewed are the large number of Third
World integration efforts which never
achieved any results whatsoever. Because
these groups essentially existed only on
paper, there is not much to learn from their
experiences. This category includes the
East African Economic Community, the
Central African Economic and Customs
Union, the West African Customs Union,
the Economic Cooperation among Maghrib
Countries, the Regional Cooperation for
Development among Pakistan, Iran and
Turkey, and the Mano River Union.
A second category of integration
attempts which will not be examined are
those that were initiated in the 1980s and
which are still ongoing. Included in this
category are four principal trade
groupings: the Preferential Trade Area for
Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA); the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); the
Southern African Development
Coordination Conference (SADCC); and
the Lagos Plan of Action. Each of these
trade groupings have achieved some
success. The PTA, initiated in 1984, has
Stephen G Brooks
begun to implement its program for tariff
elimination, which has a goal of
eliminating all barriers to trade by the year
2000. The GCC, initiated in the 1981, has
already eliminated virtually all tariffs on
intra -regional trade. The SADCC has
helped to increase the amount of foreign
capital in the region, as well as improving
the communications and transportation
links between the group's members. These
four trade blocs have not been included in
this study for two principal reasons. As I
am more interested in understanding and
identifying those common factors which
have militated against successful
implementation of Third World integration
schemes, it is more productive to survey
those proposals which were not successful.
It is also more difficult to evaluate and
draw conclusions about these four trade
blocs than those which have already run
their course, as partial implementation
records are not nearly as definitive.
For the eight trade groupings
included in this section, I will briefly
outline the basic motivating factors for
their emergence, the most fundamental
aspects of their structure, their underlying
goals, and their accomplishments. It is
obviously impossible to give an accurate
portrayal of each of these trade blocs in
only a few pages. For the purposes of this
study, it is merely important to
comprehend the broad outlines of these
groups. The information in this section
will provide the basis for the more
important analysis that will occur in the
next section, where the common lessons
that can be drawn from examining these
organizations will be described.
Caribbean Common Market
In the 1960s, the Caribbean
economies were largely competitive rather
than complementary, and most of the
region's exports consisted of primary
products such as bananas, sugar, and
citrus that were sent to the industrialized
world rather than traded within the
region." As a result, integration in the
Caribbean seemed an unlikely prospect.
However, supporters of Caribbean
integration maintained that the process
could have beneficial effects in terms of
promoting the development of industrial
goods. 14 Discussions therefore
concentrated on means to increase the
available market size of the region.
Integration efforts were aided by a
relatively common West Indian identity
that emerged from common experience
with colonial rule. 15
The first attempt at Caribbean
integration was inaugurated in 1965. The
Caribbean Free Trade Area (CARIFTA)
aimed to eliminate all barriers to trade in
basic commodities, and eliminate import
duties on manufactured goods over a five
year period. *° Tariff cuts were delayed,
however, as the agreement was not ratified
until 1968. Nevertheless, trade barriers
were significantly reduced during the first
five years of the agreement, and the
proportion of exports within the region
increased from 3 per cent in 1967 to 5 per
^Inter-American Development Bank , p. 53
^Wionczek
, p. 126
l^Gambari , p. 104
16Hall, Kenneth O. "The Carribean
Community." In International Economic
Integration edited by AM M. El-Agraa. 1988.
London: Macmillan Tress, p. 220.
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cent in 1973.*' Efforts were directed not
only at reducing intra-regional tariffs but
also at broadening the group's
membership. In 1973, accords were signed
in Georgetown, Guyana to establish a
larger Caribbean Common Market
(CAR1COM). The initial members of the
CARICOM were Antigua, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent, and Trinidad and
Tobago.18
The CARICOM treaty aimed to
strengthen "the coordination and
regulation of economic and trade relations"
among the participating countries.
Specifically, the treaty aimed to build upon
the successes of CARIFTA by further
reducing intra-regional tariffs. The
agreement also sought to establish a
common level of protection with respect to
imports from outside the Community.
Because other Third World integration
efforts had led to inequitable distribution
of gains and benefits, CARICOM sought to
make sure that "special opportunities were
provided to the less developed countries"
within the group. In order to accomplish
this goal, certain products from the less
developed members of the group were
assigned a guaranteed market share within
the community.^ In addition, CARICOM
sought to establish certain regional
''Demas, William and Jasper Scotland.
"Experiences in Regional Cooperation: The Case
of the Carribbean Community and Common
Market (CARICOM)." In Regional Integration:
the Latin American Experience edited by by
AltafGauhar. 1985. London: Third World
Foundation, p. 162.
18Gambari . p. 104
19Demas and Scotland , p. 161
industries. In the first step towards this
process, a number of studies were
undertaken to determine the relevant
criteria for the selection and location of
industries.^
CARICOM had much broader goals
than many other Third World integration
efforts, seeking to coordinate in a number
of areas besides economic policy2 * The
members of CARICOM sought to develop
a common stance for the region on foreign
policy issues, and envisioned the creation
of joint overseas Missions and Embassies.
Functionalist cooperation was another key
goal of the architects of CARICOM. As a
result, the treaty included provisions to
promote "greater understanding among its
peoples and the advancement of their
social and cultural development." It was
also hoped that judicial activity could also
be coordinated through the West Indies
Associated States Supreme Court.22
In its initial stages, CARICOM
achieved substantial progress. By 1982,
more than 90% of goods traded within the
region did not face any tariffs. As a result
of this liberalization, intra-regional trade
increased from 5% of the region's total
exports in 1973 to nearly 9% by 1982.23
Some progress was made on implementing
a common external tariff, especially among
the more prosperous members of the
group. However, exemption lists gave
individual countries the means to
effectively set their own rates of import
protection, which significantly reduced the
^Demas and Scotland, p. 164
21 Hall. p. 225
^Gambari . p. 105
^^Demas and Scotland , p. 162
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compatibility of tariff schedules within the
region.24
There were a number of factors
which constrained the long-term progress
ofCARICOM. The provisions providing
for guaranteed market share for exports
from the less developed members as well
as the attempts to establish regional
industries both proved impossible to
implement and did not advance beyond
the initial planning stage. 25 Significantly,
the small size of the market made regional
import substitution extremely inefficient.
In addition, a number of political disputes
developed within the community,
reflecting the general level of political
instability that existed in the region during
the 1970s and early 1980s. The primary
factor, however, which vitiated attempts at
integration was that barriers to trade
which had been lowered in the 1970s were
raised in the following decade. During the
1980s, a number of member countries
experienced severe balance of payments
problems. As a result, many countries
devalued their currencies and imposed
comprehensive quantitative restrictions on
imports, with no exceptions for intra-
regional goods.2°
ASEAN Preferential Tariff Agreement
The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967 by
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei,
Indonesia, and the Philippines. The group
was formed in order to promote economic,
24 Hall. p. 227
25Demasand Scotland , p. 164
^"Inter-American Development Bank
, p. 59
social and cultural cooperation among its
six members. For the first decade of its
existence, the group did little to promote
economic integration among its members,
concentrating instead on political relations.
Most of the group's activities were
centered around developing consensus
with reference to the Vietnam War.27
By the mid-1970s there was an
increased desire among the group's
members to improve the level of intra-
regional trade, which was only around
13% of ASEAN's total foreign trade. As a
result, the group signed the ASEAN
Concord at the Bali summit in 1976. The
Concord outlined goals for cooperation in
four principal economic areas: basic
commodities, specifically food and energy;
promoting the establishment of large-scale
ASEAN industrial projects; reducing intra-
regional barriers to trade; and devising
joint approaches and positions with regard
to international economic issues.2° In the
end, reducing regional trade barrier was
the only one of the four issues where
ASEAN produced concrete deadlines.
In 1977, the economy ministers of
the four countries drafted a treaty to
establish the ASEAN Preferential Trading
Agreement (PTA). The PTA's goals were
not as extensive as most other integration
efforts in the Third World, in that it did not
even aim to establish a free trade area, let
alone a customs union. Tariffs were to be
2
'Wong, J. ASEAN Economies in Perspective: A
Comparative Study of Indonesia. Malaysia, the
Phillipines. Singapore and Thailand . 1979.
London: Macmillan Press.
2
"Carranza, Mario E. Regional Security and
Economic Integration in Latin America and
Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study
(unpublished)
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reduced on a product by product basis and
decisions about which products to include
in the agreement were made by
consensus.29 As a result, the objections of
a single country to a certain product being
included in the agreement could normally
prevent all the other ASEAN countries
from reaping the benefits of freer trade in
that particular product.30
Under the accord, almost 16,000
products were given preferential trade
status, but this huge number belies the true
extent of the agreement. Those goods that
were included in the agreement were
either meaningless items that were not
traded, or were goods which already faced
low tariff rates.31 The PTA thus failed to
increase intra-ASEAN trade because most
goods that were actually traded were
excluded from the agreement. Goods
included in the PTA account for only 5% of
ASEAN's intra-regional trade.32
ASEAN also advanced two
proposals for increasing industrial
cooperation within the region. Under the
ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIP) program,
countries were to be granted comparative
advantage within the region in five specific
industries. Equity in these five industries
was to be jointly held by the members of
ASEAN, with one industry to be located in
2yWong, J. "The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations." In International Economic Integration
edited by Ali M. EI-Agraa. 1988. London:
Macmillan Press.
30yVong
. The Association of Southeast Nations,
p. 318
^ International Economic News . January 13,
1992.
32Asian Wall Street Journal. January 24, 1992, p.
1
each country .33 Copper-processing was
allocated to the Philippines, a diesel engine
plant for Singapore, a rock salt/soda ash
project for Thailand, and urea projects for
Indonesia and Malaysia.34 ASEAN
encountered great difficulties in raising the
necessary investment finance for these
industrial projects, however, and there was
consequently little or no progress made in
promoting this program.35
Attempts were made to strengthen
the PTA in 1982 and again in 1987, but
reducing the agreement's exemption list
proved politically impossible. Rather than
increasing trade linkages with each other,
the members of ASEAN have concentrated
upon developing exports markets in Japan,
the United States, and Europe. Because of
the difficulties of promoting economic
cooperation, the group decided to
concentrate upon improving its role as a
forum for dialogue on political and
security issues facing the region.
Latin American Free Trade Association
The Latin American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA) was formed in order
to increase the scope of industrialization
beyond basic consumer industries and
primary products. Demand for the
region's primary products had declined
"Gambari, Ibrahim. Political and Comparative
Dimensions of Regional Integration . 1991.
London: Humanities Press Interntional, p. 111.
^United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. Current Problems of Economic
Integration . 1986. New York: United Nations, p.
97.
^United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, p. 99
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substantially in the 1950s, and integration
was seen as a means of promoting the
development of newer, more dynamic
industries. LAFTA was created in 1960 by
the Montevideo Treaty, which was initially
signed by Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Mexico,
Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay. Within one
year LAFTA was expanded to include
Colombia and Ecuador, and a few years
later Venezuela and Bolivia became
members.
LAFTA 's goal was to create a free
trade area by 1973. The group's members
pledged to have regular negotiations every
three years in order to decide the program
of tariff reductions. Tariff cuts were
scheduled to be made on goods that
member governments agreed to put on one
of two specified lists: the national lists,
where countries pledged to reduce tariffs
by 8% after every round of negotiations;
and the common lists, which were goods
on which countries in LAFTA agreed to
eliminate trade barriers over 12 years.36
There was no attempt to establish a
common external tariff or to coordinate the
members' economies in any way.3'
In addition to tariff reductions, the
members of LAFTA agreed to try and
increase the "integration and compatibility
of their economies" by coordinating "their
import and export regimes, as well as the
treatment they accord to capital, goods and
services from outside the area. "3" The
treaty also envisioned closer coordination
of industrialization policies within the
region. No specific provisions on
achieving either of these goals were
included in the treaty, however.
There was some progress on tariff
reductions in the early stages of the
agreement. As a result, intra-regional
trade increased from $299 million in 1961
to $675 million in 1966.39 However, the
agreement soon suffered, because of the
politicized nature of tariff reductions.
Difficult choices were avoided because
countries had substantial latitude over
selection of industries that thev would
reduce tariffs 40 In addition, items on the
common lists were often duplicated by the
national lists, which further reduced the
overall impact of tariff reductions.
Most importantly, a serious dispute
developed within the agreement because
member countries were at substantially
different stages of development. In
general, the larger, more industrialized
countries within the group benefited
disproportionately compared to the
smaller, less developed members. New
industries tended to be established only in
those countries which were already
industrialized. Efforts to resolve this
dispute by granting special preferences to
the smaller economies within the group
proved unsuccessful, and the program of
- "Inter-American Development Bank. Economic
and Social Progress in Latin America: Economic
Integration . 1984. Washington: Inter-American
Development Bank, pp. 16-17.
3' Haas, Ernst B. and Thillipe Schmitter. The
Folitics of Latin American Economic Integration .
Monograph Series in World Affairs. 1965.
Denver: University of Denver.
^Chapter 3 of the Montevideo Treaty
- "Wionczek, Miguel S. Economic Cooperation
in Latin America, Africa and Asia . 1969.
Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, p. 36.
4^Manzetti, Luigi. "Argentine-Brazilian
Economic Integration: An Early Appraisal."
Latin American Research Review. Vol. 25, No. 3,
p. 111.
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tariff reductions soon ground to a halt due
to the objections raised by the smaller
economies within LAFTA.41
Andean Pact
The Andean Pact was formed in
reaction to the inequitable distribution of
gains from LAFTA. The two small
countries most critical of LAFTA, Chile
and Colombia, were the main architects of
the Andean Pact. In 1966, the leaders of
the these two countries invited the other
small states in LAFTA, Peru, Venezuela,
Bolivia and Ecuador, to a meeting to
discuss ways to change LAFTA so that it
was not so injurious to their interests.42 At
this time, discussions were initiated about
the possibility of forming a smaller
association within LAFTA. Eventually, the
agreements that resulted from these
discussions became the basis for the
Cartagena Agreement, which was signed
in 1969 to inaugurate the Andean Pact.43
The Andean Pact was perhaps the
most innovative attempt at Third World
economic integration. The framers of the
Andean Pact envisioned the creation of a
common market by 1979. Tariffs were to
4lAvery, William F. and James D. Cochrane.
"Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The
Andean Common Market." International
Organization, Spring 1973, p. 184.
42Avery, William P. and James D. Cochrane.
"Innovation in Latin American Regionalism: The
Andean Common Market." International
Organization . Spring 1973
^Penaherrera, Germanico. "The Andean Pact:
Problems and Perspectives." In Regional
Integration: The Latin American Experience
edited by AltafGauhar. 1985. London: Third
World Foundation, p. 171.
be cut by the member states at a rate of
10% per year, and a common external tariff
was to be established by 1985. In addition
to regular negotiations between the
respective governments in the agreement,
a two-tiered regional decision-making
structure was created to formulate policies
to reach the group's objectives.44
As a result of its formation, the
main components of the agreement tried to
make up for LAFTA 's inadequacies, and a
strong emphasis was placed upon
developing a regional approach to
development. Special incentives were
given to the less developed members of the
group, Bolivia and Ecuador, such as
priority in regional development plans, an
additional five years to eliminate tariffs
and to comply with the common external
tariff, and preference in receiving funds
from the Andean Development
Corporation. The chief task of the Andean
Development Corporation was to promote
integration by funding regional
development projects. Specifically, it was
hoped that the corporation would increase
the ease of intra-regional communication
and transportation.
A significant characteristic of the
Andean Pact was that a number of
stringent restrictions on foreign capital
were stipulated in the agreement. In the
manufacturing sector, profit transfers out
of the region were limited to nothing
greater than 14% of the amount of the
investment. In order to discourage foreign
ownership, only industries with more than
51% domestic ownership were entitled to
^Morawetz, David. The Andean Group: A
Case Study of in Economic Integration among
Developing Countries . 1973. Cambridge: the
M.I.T. Press, p. 7.
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benefit from tariff liberalization 45 As a
result of these restrictions, there was a
large reduction in foreign investment
within the region. In fact, immediately
after this code was announced, a total of
eighty-four US investments were
canceled.^
One of the most distinctive features
of the Andean Pact was the process
whereby countries were assigned regional
monopolies in certain products. Rather
than establishing industries according to
comparative advantage, industries were
selected according to a two-step
administrative process. In the first step,
technical experts undertook feasibility
studies and then made recommendations
as to which industries should locate in
what countries. These recommendations
were then forwarded to a committee,
whose allocation decision was then
binding over the member states.**'
In principle, the design of the
Andean Pact was very impressive.
However, it failed to have a significant
impact because of disputes between
members over which development plans
were most appropriate. There were
substantial disagreements arising from
countries' fear that they would not receive
their share of benefits. Due to these
parochial attitudes, virtually no progress
was made on establishing regional
45Milenky . p. 89.
4»Avery and Cochrane, p. 198.
4'The technical experts were officially called the
junta, while the committe which ultimately
apportioned industries was the Commission.
Countries not awarded an industry were still
allowed to produce that good, but faced the
tariff rates that existed before the agreement
came into being.
industries. In addition, the reduction in
foreign investment was not supplemented
by an increase in capital from within the
pact, which constrained infrastructural
improvements. Progress in the Andean
Pact reached a virtual standstill in 1974,
and the group remained in stasis
throughout the remainder of the 1970s and
all of the 1980s.
Central American Common Market
In the 1950s, Central America did
not appear to be a very promising
candidate for economic integration. There
was very little compatibility between the
five economies, and the economies
themselves were both extremely small and
highly dependent upon the export of
primary products. Nevertheless, each of
the Central American countries was
deluged by reports and studies from the
United Nations Economic Commission for
Latin America (ECLA) which praised the
benefits of economic integration. Largely
as a result of this external coaxing, the five
countries established the Central American
Economic Cooperation Committee
(CAECC) in 1952, which consisted of the
economy ministers of these five
countries.48 Progress towards economic
integration was greatly assisted by the lack
of political differences between the various
governments. With the possible exception
of Costa Rica, the remaining countries in
the region were remarkably similar in
terms of their economic structures and
4°Bulmer-Thomas, Victor G. "The Central
American Common Market." In International
Economic Integration edited by Ali M. El-Agraa.
1988. London: Macmillan Press, p. 284
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policies.49 The discussions held by the
CAECC eventually led to the drafting of a
plan for integration in the region, which
was officially agreed to with the signing of
the Managua Treaty in 1960.
The goal of the Central American
Common Market (CACM) was nothing
less than the establishment of a regional
economy. It was hoped that "one step
would unerringly follow another-
Common Market, customs union,
economic union- on the road to regional
unity. "50 As a result of its ambitious goals,
CACM aimed to reduce tariffs on intra-
regional trade very quickly, within six
years of the ratification of the treaty. The
agreement also sought to establish a
common external tariff in approximately
the same period of time. Unlike other
Third World integration efforts, CACM
was not plagued by a long list of product
exemptions. Very few goods, namely basic
foodstuffs and certain non-durable
consumer goods, were not scheduled for
tariff reductions.^
In order to promote development,
the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CABEI) was created. The
bank's primary purposes were to grant
technical assistance for infrastructure
projects to increase the linkages between
the five economies, to finance long-term
industrial development projects, and to
help coordinate agricultural projects.52
Unlike many other regional development
banks that were initiated by developing
countries at this time, the purpose of
CABEI was not to reduce dependence on
foreign capital. As a result, funds for the
bank came not only from the respective
governments, but also the United States
Agency for International Development
(AID), the Inter-American Development
Bank, and private banks such as Bank of
America. Between 1962 and the middle of
1966, CABEI granted over $80 million in
loans to the five countries.^
Progress on tariff reductions was
remarkably rapid. By 1966, approximately
98% of the tariffs on intra-regional trade
had already been eliminated. A common
level of protection vis-a-vis products from
the rest of the world had been established
for almost 807o of the region's imports.
Reducing tariff barriers was made possible
largely because of the low level of
industrialization within the region. Unlike
many other attempts at integration in the
Third World, there were not many
established industries which sought"
continued protection from imports.54
Because of the sharp drop in tariff barriers,
there was a substantial increase in intra-
regional trade. Intra-regional trade
increased from $36.9 million in 1961 to
approximately $175 million in 1966.^5
**^Gert Rosenthal. "The Lessons of Economic
Integration in Latin America: The Case of
Central America" in Regional Integration: the
Latin American Experience edited by by Altaf
Gauhar. 1985. London: Third World
Foundation, p. 143
50Rpsenthal . p. 144




^Edwards, S. and M. Savastano. "Latin
America's Intra-regional Trade: Evolution and
Future Prospects." In Economic Aspects of
Regional Trading Agreements edited by D.
Greenaway. 1989. New York: New York
University Press.
^Wionczek . p. 104
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The substantial progress in CACM
was quickly halted, however, as a result of
the outbreak of armed hostilities between
El Salvador and Honduras in 1969. Poor
conditions in El Salvador had caused
approximately 300,000 of its citizens to
migrate to neighboring Honduras.
Lacking legal permits, these individuals
were unable to obtain any of the land
distributed by the Honduran government.
As a result, many of these migrants
returned to El Salvador with stories of
mistreatment, which strained relations
between the two countries. Hostilities
commenced on July 14, 1969 when El
Salvador invaded Honduras following an
emotional soccer match between the two
countries. The "Soccer War" led to a
complete breakdown in trade between the
two countries, and caused a complete
disruption of CACM. Attempts to revive
CACM at the end of the 1970s were
temporarily successful, but soon foundered
after the revolution in Nicaragua. The new
Sandinista government in Nicaragua had
no intention of cooperating with
neighboring market economies. An
intense civil war in El Salvador further
heightened political differences within the
region, and obviated any attempt to revive
CACM.56
Arab Common Market
Israel. As a result, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen signed
the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic
Cooperation. 57 The treaty did little more
than create a council which consisted of the
Economic Ministers of each of the
respective countries. However, three years
later, in May 1953, this council reached
agreement on the need to form an Arab
Common Market. 5° Besides aggregating
these countries military capacities, the aim
was to increase regional specialization and
to produce with economies of scale. Of
greater importance, the council hoped to
create a unified policy on the extraction of
petroleum, in order to reduce the influence
of companies from the industrialized
world which currently controlled the
region's oil resources.
In response to the council's
recommendations, the Agreement for
Economic Unity was created in 1957. The
goals of this treaty were quite extensive, as
it aimed not just for the elimination of
barriers to trade but also to the free
movement of all the factors of production,
with "the rights of residence and
employment, transit, ownership,
trusteeship, and inheritance" to be
recognized throughout the region.5
"
Fiscal, monetary and foreign trade policies
were also to be coordinated and a common
level of protection was to be established on
In 1950, after Israel's status as an
independent state had become fully
codified, many Arab countries felt that it
was necessary to form a larger federation
in order to balance the military potential of
56Bulmer-Thomas. p. 300.
57Wionczek. p. 284
5"Hani, M. Bani. "Obstacles to Arab Economic
Integration." In Tbe Problems of Arab Economic
Development and Integration edited by Adda
Guecioueur. 1984. Boulder: Westview, p. 180.
^Wionczek . p. 285
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goods form outside the union."0 Tariffs on
intra-regional trade were scheduled to be
completely eliminated by 1974.61 By the
end of 1963, the agreement had been
signed by Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, and
United Arab Emirates, with the treaty
becoming effective in 1964.
In the early stages of the agreement,
tariffs were reduced somewhat. As a
result, trade flows increased significantly,
from $21 million in 1961 to $70 million in
1965. The agreement was significantly
weakened by Article 14, however, which
stated that member countries may apply
"for the exclusion of certain products from
the duty and tax exemption or reductions
applied, and from the removal of
quantitative restrictions by reasons of real
and justifiable causes.""^ Countries were
able to exercise considerable latitude as to
which industries qualified for tariff
reductions. As a result, the scope of tariff
cuts became significantly reduced.
Political tensions within the group
further weakened the process of tariff
liberalization. Syria had serious disputes
with both Iraq and the United Arab
Emirates, and Jordan was distanced from
virtually all of the other members of the
pact.63 In addition to political discord, the
five economies were very incompatible.
Iraq and Syria were pursuing policies of
"^Musrey, Alfred. An Arab Common Market:
Studies in Inter-Arah Trade Relations. 1920-1967
.
1969. New York: Praeger, p. 108
"^ Musrey. p. 3
62Wionczek . p. 286
"^Makdishi, Samir. "Arab Economic
Cooperation: Implications for the Arab World."
In Arab Industrialization and Economic
Integration edited by Roberto Aliboni. 1979.
London: Croom Helm, p. 101.
state socialism, which made any of the
attempts at economic coordination within
the region virtually impossible.°* As a
result, the agreement soon became
completely fragmented and the small
progress that had been made on tariff
reductions was reversed.
Economic Community of West African
States
The Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) was created on
May 28, 1975. The group consisted of
sixteen states: Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Togo, and Burkina Faso. The goals
of the group were very extensive,
including the reduction in tariffs and
quotas within the region and the
establishment of a common external
tariff.65 The agreement went much further
than many other Third World integration
efforts, in that it also called for the
elimination of the barriers to free
movement of people, the coordination of
agriculture policy, the development of
regional infrastructure, the coordination of
monetary policy; and the pooling of
investment funds for mineral extraction.66
These objectives were initially scheduled to
be implemented over a fifteen year period.
Besides seeking economies of scale
and the rationalization of production, the
members of ECOWAS saw a need for
^Makdishi. p. 112.
"^Gambari . p. 29
^Ezenwe, Uze. ECOWAS and the Economic
Integration of West Africa . 1983. London: C.
Hurst & Co, p. 127.
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regional approaches to several other issues.
A principal reason ascribed for the low
level of trade linkages between the
members of ECOWAS was the design of
the region's roads and railway systems.
Because this infrastructure had been set up
by the colonial powers, most of the
principal transportation in the region ran
from the coast to each separate country.
As a result, commodities could be more
easily shipped outside of the region than
within it. The members of ECOWAS
hoped that a coordinated plan for
infrastructure development could remove
this impediment to trade within the region.
Member countries also sought to augment
production of the region's rich deposits of
natural resources, including petroleum,
iron ore and bauxite. It was hoped that
pooling funds between the groups
members would made it easier to
developing these resources, as many of the
smaller members did not have sufficient
investment in this area.6 ' Finally, a
number of the countries in ECOWAS are
land-locked and this tenuous access to the
sea had a significant negative effect upon
foreign investment. These land-locked
states hoped that access to the sea "would
be regularized and placed on a sounder
basis" as a result of ECOWAS 68
The first five years of the agreement
largely focused on designing the necessary
protocols and regulations for reaching
their group's objectives. As a result, there
were very few actual steps which were
taken to reduce barriers to trade."" The
members of ECOWAS viewed this as a
necessary process, however, and not a
delay in the treaty. After the regulations
were in place is, however, the group's
efforts were significantly restrained.
Virtually no progress was made in
adopting a common external tariff or in
reducing intra-regional tariffs. The plan to
pool investment funds for the purpose of
mineral extraction proved impossible to
coordinate, as member countries were
unable to decide upon the distribution of
benefits. Common passports were issued
to the citizens of the member countries, but
true safeguards with regard to
employment in other member countries
proved elusive.?0
While tariff reductions and other
regional economic reforms proved elusive,
some notable gains were achieved by the
organization. Progress was delayed in
terms of improving land transportation,
yet ECOWAS made considerable gains
with regard to the construction of more
advanced telecommunications links within
the region/1 Ironically, perhaps the most
tangible results that ECOWAS has
achieved have ironically been in the
political arena. A number of disputes
within the region, such as Ghana-Togo and
Liberia-Sierra Leone, were negotiated in
part through ECOWAS. 72
"' Gamhari
. p. 25
68Gamhari . p. 26
"^Ezenwe . p. 51
^Gambari
, p. 61
7 * Ezenwe . p. 74
72Gambari, p. 60
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Common Structural
Deficiencies Which Led to the
Failure of Integration Efforts
in the 1960s and 1970s
Product Coverage and the Process of
Tariff Reductions & Exemptions
The greatest obstacle to any form of
trade liberalization is that opening up
markets invariably leads to economic
dislocations such as displacement of
workers employed in inefficient industries.
While the vast majority of people in a
country benefit by having open markets,
the net benefit that they derive is small in
comparison to the intense pain that is felt
by workers who lose their jobs as a result
of foreign competition. As a result,
political leaders often choose to appease
those who care most intensely about the
prospect of markets opening, which are
those people who argue for continued
protection. For this reason, it is important
that tariff reduction programs be automatic
and not subject to exemptions or delays.
Instead of limiting political barriers
to trade liberalization, most Third World
integration efforts were structured in such
a way so as to encourage the development
of political opposition. Rather than
including all goods in the tariff reduction
process, countries were normally able to
choose the specific industries where they
wanted to reduce trade barriers. Whether
an industry became scheduled for trade
liberalization became a political question,
and countries for the most part carried
through with tariff reductions only when
no domestic industries were threatened.
Policy makers normally sought to expand
trade only in sectors that their country was
capable of exporting. This reluctance to
allow unproductive industries to be
replaced by more efficient regional
producers was caused by allegiance to
import substitution. It was not efficiency
that these countries were seeking, but
rather the continuation of a domestic
economic policy applied on a regional
scale.
Political opposition was fostered to
a further degree because many Third
World integration treaties stipulated that
the member countries needed to meet
every few years in order to negotiate each
round of tariff reductions. This meant that
industries which did not win exemptions
in an earlier round of negotiations could
lobby their government at the next round.
In addition, most Third World integration
attempts contained some method of
permanently exempting products from
tariff reductions. Even in instances where
exemptions were granted only a temporary
basis, there was a tendency for these
exemptions to become permanent due to
the fact that there was normally no
mechanism for reducing or eliminating
these lists of excluded projects.
As a result of the existence of
various forms of exemptions, the focus of
industry efforts was to lobby their
governments for continued protection
rather than preparing themselves for more
competition. Governments soon became
fixated on the negotiation process, as
opposed to devising methods for tariff
reduction. Tariff cuts were frequently
postponed, often to the point where it
became impossible to comply with the
agreement.
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The most significant repercussion
of low product coverage was that it
prevented regional specialization, which is
necessary to achieve economies of scale
within a trade bloc. The preferable
outcome from an efficiency and
distribution standpoint is for trade
diversion to be as small as possible, and
this is accomplished when the most
efficient firms produce goods for the
region. However, specialization can only
occur if countries that lose industries do
not take actions to block the process.
Uneven Levels of Development and
Inequitable Gains from Integration
Many developing country trade
pacts failed in large part because there was
not an equitable distribution of the costs
and benefits resulting from integration.
Certain categories of countries tended to
gain disproportionately as a result of large
economic disparities within regional
groups. In general, the large,
industrialized countries within Third
World trade pacts benefited at the expense
of smaller and less developed economies.
New industries, which represented much
of the gains of regional integration, tended
to be set up where a significant industrial
base already existed. As a result, the
countries that were already relatively
developed tended to become more so,
while those that were not developed
remained relatively unaffected. Ironically,
the pattern of dependency, where a
dominant center benefited from a weak
periphery, was in many respects replicated
within developing country trade blocs.
There were two important
repercussions from the inequitable
distribution of integration gains. In order
to protect themselves against further harm,
the smaller, less developed countries in
many trade blocs frequently pressed for a
reduction in both the scope and speed of
tariff reductions. Because decisions about
the terms of the integration treaties were
frequently made according to consensus,
the objections of the smaller countries had
a significant negative impact on the scope
of many agreements.
The second important ramification
was that many regional blocs attempted to
mollify the objection of the smaller
countries by instituting special programs
to assist them. It was hoped that reducing
disparity within the group would promote
intra-regional trade and also ensure the
compliance of these smaller countries. The
preferences extended to smaller countries
included priority in regional development
plans, precedence in regional
infrastructural projects, additional time to
eliminate tariffs, and priority in receiving
investment funds from regional banks.
In practice, the positions of the
smaller, less developed countries were not
significantly advanced as a result of these
assistance programs. In the end, the large
countries proved to be largely unwilling to
make any concessions to the smaller
economies. As a result, the scope of the
assistance programs proved to be minimal,
with very few projects being advanced and
those that did proceed normally had
deficient funding. Significantly, however,
the declaratory policies of many trade
pacts continued to proclaim that the
welfare of the less developed countries
would be improved because of their
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association with the regional pact. The
lack of enthusiasm of many smaller
countries towards regional integration can
be at least partially attributed to the
fostering of expectations that they would
experience significant economic
advancement as a result of assistance from
the rest of the trade pact.
Military Rule and Regional Rivalries
A particularly important constraint
upon regional integration in the Third
World was the prevalence of military rule
throughout the region during the 1960s
and 1970s. Regional military leaders
tended to have a particularly skewed view
of foreign trade, and often promoted a
relatively more closed economy on the
grounds that domestic industries needed
to be protected because their existence was
crucial for national security. Military
rulers did not want to be dependent on
other countries, especially their neighbors,
for crucial military supplies. While it is
difficult to determine how many industries
in the Third World were protected on this
basis, it was a significant amount,
especially in the area of heavy industry.
Trade with neighboring countries
was often negatively affected to an even
greater degree as military governments
frequently played up regional tensions as a
means of strengthening their legitimacy.
The justification for military rule would be
greatly reduced if there was no external
security threat, hence cooperation of any
sort was usually counterproductive to
these governments. It is likely that
military governments were particularly
loathe to engage in integration because of
the popularity of functionalism at this
time. Functionalist theory contends that
regional integration is a means of
strengthening political ties in order to
move beyond traditions of mutual
suspicion. Functionalism regards
dependence on other countries for
important goods as an excellent means of
preventing hostilities from occurring, as it
highlights the benefits of cooperation
between countries. Rather than
encouraging perceptions of neighboring
countries as partners, military leaders often
actively sought to impede this from
occurring and therefore shied away from
regionalization.
Regional military tensions
decreased not just the attractiveness but
also the efficacy of economic integration
efforts. For obvious reasons, it is very
difficult to engage in economic integration
with a country that is militarily
threatening; as the process requires
countries to make mutual concessions in
order for the agreement to progress. In the
examples of successful economic
integration, the respective members were
not suspicious of each other, as all the
potential security problems were outside
of these economic groupings. In contrast,
history is replete with examples where
economic integration has failed because
significant security tensions have existed
between the members of trade blocs. This
trend was particularly evident within Latin
America, as all the efforts at economic
integration in the 1960s and 1970s were
fettered by regional rivalries. The Central
American Common Market (CACM) is the
most prominent example, as the group's
relative success was completely curtailed
by the Soccer War in 1969 between
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Honduras and El Salvador. Within the
Andean Pact, regional cooperation was
hindered by rivalries between Peru and
Ecuador, who engaged in armed conflict in
1941, as well as Chile's disputes with both
Bolivia and Peru, which date back to the
1879-84 War of the Pacific. Progress in the
Latin American Free Trade Association
was restricted by quarrels between Chile
with both Argentina and Brazil, and
between the latter two countries
themselves. Outside of Latin America,
there existed great suspicion between
many of members of ASEAN, despite
seeming uniformity over the Vietnam War.
Within the Arab Common Market, tensions
existed between Syria and both Iraq and
the United Arab Emirates. Military
tensions between Ghana and Togo and
also Liberia and Sierra Leone significantly
constrained the implemenation of
ECOWAS.
Non-Tariff Barriers
A significant shortcoming with
most Third World trade pacts was that
there was insufficient attention paid to the
problems posed by non-tariff barriers
(NTBs). With the exception of the Andean
Pact, no serious effort was made to reduce
informal barriers to trade, and this
omission significantly vitiated
liberalization efforts. In a number of trade
pacts, such as the Central American
Common Market, progress in reducing
tariffs had little effect largely because
informal barriers to trade were enacted by
countries as a replacement.
Given the large role of central
governments in the economies of the Third
World at this time, the lack of treatment of
both government purchasing and export
promotion policies was an especially
important deficiency. As a result, more
efficient industries in one country often
were at a comparative disadvantage in
relation to less efficient industries in
another country which received substantial
governmental assistance. Such policies
caused the distribution of benefits from
integration to be skewed, reduced
international competitiveness, and caused
a drain on public resources in those
countries which engaged in significant
subsidization.
While the Andean Pact
aggressively dealt with this issue, the
group nevertheless ran into significant
problems. While NTBs were officially
banned, the definition of what constituted
an NTB was not broad enough to remove
all impediments to trade within the region.
As a result, "in practice several procedures
still served to subvert the purposes of the
program; state trading, customs clearing
requirements, import documentation of
identification of origin. "'^ Efforts to
remove NTBs were further hampered by
the fact that no enforcement mechanism
were built into the agreement in this area.
High and Divergent Tariff Structures
A significant hamper on Third
World integration was the fact that the
tariff structures of countries within each
73Kuczyinski, M. and D. Huelin. 1973. The
Andean Group: Trade. Industry and Forei&H
Investment . London: Latin American
Publications Fund, p. 8.
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bloc tended to be both high and also
greatly divergent at the outstet of
integration efforts. The high level of
protection was largely because most
countries were pursuing import
substitution strategies at this time. The
divergence of tariff protection was the
result of both different factor endowments
and also varying choices about which
industries to protect caused by differing
political and economic philosophies.
These high and divergent tariff structures
had negative effects upon the efficacy of
integration efforts for three important
reasons.
High tariff rates were a significant
cause of the low level of intra-regional
trade that existed before integration efforts
began. While the lack of trade between
Third World countries was due to a
number of reasons, including similar factor
endowments and the legacy of colonial
trade patterns, high levels of protection
were an extremely important element. As
a result, very few Third World trade pacts
had much intra-regional trade upon which
to build. In the Andean Pact, for example,
intra-regional exports accounted for a mere
2% of the region's total exports. Only in
ASEAN and the CACM did intra-regional
exports account for more than 10% of the
region's total exports.^4 The limited scope
of intra-regional trade made creating new
linkages much more difficult and also
caused the level of trade diversion to be
much higher.
High and divergent tariff structures
were also harmful to integration efforts
because they led to the creation of vested
interests. Many significant industries in
developing countries were capable of
surviving only so long as they were
protected from foreign competition. As a
result, these industries tended to put up
strong resistance when faced with the
prospect of reduced intra-regional tariffs.
Efforts at regional tariff reduction therefore
tended to be centered either in those
industries which were subject to relatively
few barriers before integration began or
industries which were not produced
within the region.
Perhaps the most important
repercussion of divergent tariff structures,
however, was that it made the
establishment of a common external tariff
extremely difficult. While most of Third
World integration efforts included
provisions for the establishment of a
common external tariff, practically none of
the deadlines were met. In several trade
blocs, notably the ASEAN PTA and
LAFTA, establishing a common level of
protection was not even advanced as a
policy goal. The lack of a common external
tariff resulted in a number of significant
inefficiencies. Countries with high tariff
levels on intermediate goods and primary
products became far less competitive
within their respective group, as their final
products had higher costs. Tariffs on
intermediate goods and primary products
also affected the distribution of foreign
investment, as multinational corporations
(MNCs) preferred to set up in low tariff
countries. Trade flows were further
distorted because tariff disparities
promoted smuggling. Intra-regional trade
was also reduced as a result of higher
administrative requirements.
7
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Regional Infrastructure Development
A key feature of many Third World
integration schemes was the promotion of
regional infrastructure development.
Improving the ease of intra-regional
communication and transportation was
correctly identified as being especially
important for making regional integration
successful. At this time, it was actually far
easier for many developing countries to
ship goods to and communicate with
countries in Europe or North America than
it was within their region. In order to
promote linkages within the region, many
trade pacts established regional banks in
order to fund regional infrastructure
projects.
While many regional trade pacts
designed a number of impressive
infrastructure projects, very little tangible
benefits were achieved. For the most part,
infrastructure plans failed to have a
significant impact because of disputes
between members over which projects
were appropriate. There were substantial
disagreements arising from the fear of
participating countries that they would not
receive their share of benefits. As a result
of these fears, members began to ignore the
regional projects, and instead focused on
domestic priorities.^ Due to these
parochial attitudes, infrastructural links
hardly improved, and integration efforts
were concomitantly hampered.
Reducing regional tariffs was seen
by many policy makers in the developing
world as a vital economic tool, but one that
was probably incapable of producing
dynamic changes all by itself. It was
argued that tariff reductions could have
positive effects only if they were
conducted within an appropriate economic
environment. Consequently, many policy
makers identified the need for some degree
of regional economic planning. Regional
development plans and macro-economic
coordination were the two principal forms
of regional economic planning that were
articulated.
One of the most interesting features
of many Third World trade pacts was the
process wherebv countries were assigned
regional monopolies in certain products.
Rather than establishing industries
according to comparative advantage,
industries were selected according to an
administrative process. Typically, the first
step consisted of technical experts
undertaking feasibility studies and then
making recommendations as to which
industries should locate in what countries.
These recommendations were then
normally forwarded to a regional decision-
making body, whose allocation decision
was then binding over the member
states/6
Thse regional development
schemes made Third World integration
Regional Economic Planning
' 5Fontaine, Roger W. The Andean Tact: A
Political Analysis . The Center for Strategic and
International Studies. 1977. pp. 26-27.
'"The technical experts were officially called the
junta, while the committee which ultimately
apportioned industries was the Commission.
Countries not awarded an industry were still
allowed to produce mat good, but faced the
tariff rates that existed before the agreement
came into being.
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much more difficult to accomplish,
however. Joseph Nye argues that this form
of regional planning "involves a much
higher and deliberate sacrifice of
sovereignty than unplanned market
integration does. "77 As part of this
process, it frequently became necessary for
representatives to vote on plans which, if
implemented, would lead to substantial
economic dislocations in their respective
country. The greatest obstacle to trade
liberalization is always that opening up
markets invariably leads to substantial
displacements. This form of regional
planning ensured that a majority of
countries within a trade bloc would lose a
certain industrial sector in order for it to
prosper in a single country. Because the
loss of industries could so easily be
attributed to particular votes by countries,
assigning regional industries became an
extremely onerous political process.
Macro-economic coordination was
the second form of regional planning that
was advocated, and there were a number
of important arguments for making it a
central element of the regional integration
process. Without such coordination,
domestic criteria would dominate
decisions regarding monetary, fiscal, and
most importantly exchange rate policies,
and there would be little or no
consideration of the negative consequences
of particular policies on other countries
within the group. This would lead to
frequent changes in comparative
advantage within trade blocs that were not
77Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Comparing Common
Markets: A Revised Neo-Functionalist Model .
International Organization, Autumn 1970, p.
834.
the result of efficiency dynamics, but were
instead caused by fluctuating domestic
economic policies. The ensuing
uncertainty caused by unstable inflation
and exchange rates would significantly
constrain integration efforts.
Despite the pressing rationale for
macro-economic coordination, enacting
common policies proved to be an elusive
goal for developing country integration
schemes during this period. The inability
to coordinate policies was largely the result
of the legacy of import substitution.
Because countries were reliant upon
importing most of the capital goods that
were necessary for industrialization, there
was a tendency for governments to
appreciate the value of their currencies. In
addition, many countries during this
period ran expansionary monetary and
fiscal policies as a means of spurring
economic activity. Because most countries
were therefore pursuing targeted macro-
economic policies to promote the
development of domestic industries, there
was consequently a great reluctance to
modify these policies in favor of the
interests of the region.
Factors That Have Led to a
Resurgence in Developing
Country Regional Integration
Efforts in the 1990s
International Economic Environment
In December 1990, the Uruguay
round of the GATT negotiations reached
an impasse due to a dispute between the
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EC and the United States over agricultural
subsidies. This deadlock was particularly
upsetting to the Third World countries, as
they hoped that a successful conclusion to
the negotiations would bring an opening in
global markets, especially in the area of
agriculture. More important than the
actual deadlock in negotiations, however,
was that the United and the EC seemed to
have decided to turn inwards in reaction to
the stalemate. Soon afterwards, the
Europeans pressed ahead with renewed
vigor in their goal to establish a true
common market by 1992. Similarly, the
United States concluded negotiations with
Mexico on forming the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
At this time, it seemed to much of
the developing world that the vast bulk of
the developed world was abandoning its
commitment to world-wide free trade in
favor of regional free trade. The EC and
NAFTA are threatening to developing
countries for four principal reasons: 1) the
reduction of exports as a result of trade
diversion, 2) the diversion of foreign
investment from the Third World to those
trade blocs, 3) the difficulty of negotiating
with such powerful groupings, and 4)
negative repercussions for the
international competitiveness of Third
World exports. Each of these four factors
are discussed below.
Reduced Access to US and EC
Because most developing countries
engaged in import substitution for so long,
their markets were relatively closed to each
other. In Latin America, for instance, only
15% of trade was with other Latin
American countries in 1990. As a result of
Third World protectionism, the more open
US and European markets became the
primary destination for many developing
countries' exports. In much of the Third
World, there exists a new found awareness
of the possibilities that exists in
neighboring countries as a market for
exports. Much of this increased
appreciation is the result of the fear that
the EC and NAFTA will become insular
and will set up strict barriers to the imports
of goods from outside each economic bloc.
The EC has already established a
common external tariff, and NAFTA will
not have one, so developing nations do not
need to fear that their goods will face
higher tariffs in these two economic blocs.
Nevertheless, Third World exports to both
Europe and North America could be
reduced as a result of trade diversion,
where trade shifts to within the bloc,
replacing goods that were formerly
imported from outside the bloc. Trade
diversion occurs because there are no
restrictions on intra-bloc trade while goods
from outside the bloc still face tariffs and
other trade barriers. In addition, increased
regional consciousness will likely cause
companies, as well as consumers, to
become accustomed to searching for
suppliers within the bloc to satisfy their
demands.
The greatest fear of developing
countries is that their exports into Canada
and the United States will be replaced by
goods from Mexico, since Mexico has very
similar factor endowments to the rest of
the Third World. Trade diversion will, of
course, occur in Europe as well, since
Portugal, Greece and to a lesser extent
Spain, could play the same role in the EC
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as Mexico will in NAFTA, that of being a
low cost producer of labor-intensive goods.
The wages in these countries are not nearly
as low as in Mexico, however, so there is
less to worry about trade diversion with
regard to Europe than North America.
In addition to trade diversion,
many Third World countries are also
worried that the coalescing of the EC and
NAFTA will lead to an increase in non-
tariff barriers (NTBs) in these two
regions.78 Technical and environmental
standards, even if they are not designed to
discriminate against producers from
outside the bloc, will likely improve the
competitiveness of companies within the
bloc. Third World companies could be
hard pressed if they are required to
substantially alter their production
processes in order to comply with new
regional standards.
While exports to Europe and North
America may be reduced by trade
diversion, the creation of regional blocs in
the Third World could have the same effect
on goods that the group is currently
importing. It is hoped that trade creation
within regional blocs will offset some of
the losses of export markets in the
industrialized world. Trade creation is
extremely beneficial, since the increased
trade will be in products that are made by
either new or augmented industries within
the bloc. As a result, loss of employment
in export sectors to the EC and North
America could be offset by an increase in
goods produced within the bloc. There has
been a tremendous amount of trade
creation within the EC over the years, a
phenomenon which will likely be
duplicated within NAFTA. This increase
in intra-regional trade through the creation
of new export markets is a process which
many Third World countries wish to
emulate.
Foreign Investment
In the past, many Third World
countries were hostile or ambivalent to
foreign investment, and held that multi-
national corporations (MNCs) needed to be
strictly controlled. Now, in contrast, the
Mercosur countries see foreign investment
as crucial to improve their economies, and
regard the promise of a large, regional
market as a means of attracting capital.
Foreign investment is seen both as a source
of capital for areas of the economy that are
under-invested and as a means of spurring
the growth of new, high value-added
industries/^ As an example of this new
philosophy, Domingo Cavallo, Argentina's
Economy Minister, stated that Argentina
and many other developing countries
"used to be isolated both from capital flows
and trade and was always defiant about
and dissatisfied with the ground rules in
the world, but now it is behaving like a
country that observes these rules."^
However, just at the time when
foreign investment was being especially
sought by many Third World countries,
their ability to attract international capital
was declining as a result of the formation
of regional blocs in the industrialized
78Izam, M. "The Economic Effects of Europe
1992 on Latin America." Cepal Review. No. 43,
April 1991, p. 76.
79Clarin . 2 December 1990, p. 12
80Clarin. 2 December 1990, p. 12
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countries. Regional blocs are attractive to
foreign investors because it is possible for a
multinational corporation to set up a single
production plant to serve all the countries
within the bloc. Manufacturers can then
produce a large quantity in their
production facilities, thereby gaining the
benefits of economies of scale and
increasing profits. Currently, high tariff
rates in much of the Third world make it
difficult for MNCs to set up a single
production plant to serve many different
markets. In addition, the establishment of
a common external tariff provides a strong
inducement for a corporation to locate
within a regional bloc such as the EC. As a
result, many Third World countries feared
that MNCs would view the EC and
NAFTA as far more profitable places to
invest, thereby draining potential sources
of foreign investment away.
Regional integration is seen as an
important mechanism to prevent this shift
in foreign investment from occurring.
Prime Minister Goh of Singapore captured
this sentiment in his assertion that, "unless
ASEAN can match the other regions in
attractiveness both as a base for
investments as well as a market for their
products, investments by multinational
companies are likely to flow away from
our part of the world to Europe and
NAFTA. "81 Domingo Cavallo similarly
argues that "today, risk capital is invested
in those countries that offer better
conditions" and that "the ultimate objective
of Latin American integration is to obtain
investments for Latin American
countries. "°^ Prime Minister Chuan
Leekpai of Thailand stated that "the
possible diversion of direct foreign
investment to emerging economic blocs.. .is
a perpetual reminder that smaller
countries have to unite to make themselves
attractive to foreign investment. "°3
International Competitiveness
Many Third World countries
regard membership in a regional trade bloc
as being beneficial to maintaining their
international competitiveness. There is
great fear among developing countries that
the competitiveness of products from the
EC and NAFTA will improve as a result of
intra-bloc competition. With no barriers to
the transfer of goods within these blocs,
companies which used to be protected by
tariffs and other trade barriers will now be
forced to compete with other companies
from within the entire bloc. Consequently,
only the most efficient producers in Europe
and North America will survive the intra-
bloc competition, while inefficient
companies will fall by the wayside. Those
companies that remain will in turn have a
larger market share than they did before,
because they will take over the markets of
the companies which were forced out. As
a result of having larger market share, the
efficiency of these companies will be
further enhanced, because they will now
be able to produce utilizing economies of
scale.
si Address to the ASEAN Singapore Summit
82FB1S. 4 September 1990 (TELAM, 31 August
1990)
83The Nation [Bangkok], January 30, 1992, p. Bl
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Goods from the Third World will
therefore now have to compete with
products from Europe and North America
that will be much more competitive than
goods from these two regions were earlier.
One way for the Third World to offset this
process would be to form a trade bloc of
their own, to improve the region's
international competitiveness in the same
way as in Europe and North America.84
Argentina, for instance, sees regional
integration as a key element in its drive to
become a successful global exporter.
Domingo Cavallo has asserted that "in the
international arena, the world economy is
witnessing the creation of large economic
blocs like in Europe, southeast Asia, and
Northern America. The speed of such
processes justifies the need to create a
Latin American economic group with a
market large enough to allow us to
efficiently compete. "°5 Similarly,
President Goh of Singapore argued that "if
we don't synergize our strengths, ASEAN
will risk missing the boat. We will be
stranded as we watch others sail by"8^
Trade Negotiations
During the Uruguay round of
GATT negotiations, many countries in the
Third World felt relegated to the sidelines
as major international actors such as the
84Nevv York Times. 25 March 1991, p. Bl. Celso
Amorim stated that Latin America must adjust
to "a world trend towards economies of scale.
It's happening in Europe, the Far East, and
North America."
85OEstadode Sao Paulo 28 January 1990, p. 7
86Asian Wall Street loumal
. January 28, 1992, p.
1.
United States and the EC dominated the
negotiations. Similarly, many developing
countries felt disadvantaged when
engaging in bilateral negotiations with
large economic powers. In particular, the
actions of the United States in the last few
years, under the Super 301 provision of the
Omnibus Trade Bill, have occasionally
been a major source of irritation.
J.E. Meade argued in his classic
work that one of the purposes of a customs
union is to increase bargaining power vis-
a-vis third parties, through presenting
positions collectively, as a group, rather
than as individual countries."' In the
1960s, developing countries did not regard
it as worthwhile to try to alter the
international economy so that it was more
accommodating to their interests, but
rather maintained the best policy was to
avoid the international economy as much
as possible. This was largely because they
did not think that it was conceivable for
developing countries to have any impact in
international economic negotiations.°°
In marked contrast, many
developing countries currently view it as
possible, albeit difficult, to negotiate with
major actors in the international
economy. ^9 While they may not be able to
"'Meade, J. The Theory of Customs Unions .
1955. Amsterdam, North Holland Publishing
Company.
8
"This attitude would change substantially a
few years later, with the rise of the Group of 77
and the New International Economic Order
(NIEO) during the 1970s.
"^The current approach of countries towards
affecting changes in the international economy is
much less confrontational than the NIEO,
however, in that they are not demanding direct
cash transfers and other concessions from the
industrialized world.
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make substantial improvements, many
countries at least want to ensure that the
international situation relative to their
economic interests does not deteriorate.
Meade's conclusions have been echoed by
some important policy makers in the Third
World. President Suharto of Indonesia, in
his opening statement at the Singapore
summit, maintained it is necessary to
"enhance intra-ASEAN economic
cooperation to ensure that our role and
interests are given greater attention."
Domingo Cavallo of Argentina stated that
negotiating as a group is the best means by
which to successfully deal with "large
economic spaces" such as the EC and
NAFTA, since "our distance from the major
centers and the weakness of our economies
make it impossible for us to seek solutions
individually."^ President Rodriguez of
Paraguay stated that: "In this world made
up of huge economic blocs, Southern Cone
countries must unite in keeping with the
Treaty of Asuncion in order to have more
bargaining power at international forums."
The Decline of Import Substitution and
Reevaluation of Trade Policy
The second primary motivation for
regional integration in the 1990s is that it is
seen as a mechanism to overcome
structural economic problems. In the 1960s
and 1970s, integration was pursued in
order to strengthen import substitution,
which was a government sponsored
economic policy. Governments directly
sought to alter the economy to foster
prosperity, thereby politicizing the
integration process, as well as subjecting it
to substantial governmental review.
Currently, however, many Third World
governments recognize that it is not their
governments which will promote
economic dynamism, rather it is their
private sectors."! There is now general
consensus that import substitution has
become a significant constraint on
economic growth, as it has led to the
development of highly inefficient
industries. Such industries distort prices,
complicate the implementation of
economic plans and make the industrial
structure much less capable of dynamic
changes. The unpopularity of these
wasteful enterprises is also a reflection of
the increased emphasis on fiscal discipline
as a means of promoting development.
Inefficient companies are a drain on public
resources, which not only takes money
away from other projects but also leads to
substantial budgetary deficits, a primary
cause of inflation. As a result, a prime
policy goal within the developing is to
make these industries much more efficient,
and the best method seen to achieve this
goal was to inject more competition into
the region's economies.
The fundamental question was how
intense this external competition needed to
be. In the end, most developing countries
chose to not unilaterally open up to the rest
of the world, as Chile did in the 1970s.
Chile's open market policies were seen as
90 Gazeta Mercanril . 10 May 1991, p. 1,6
91 FBIS . 11 April 1991 (Telam, 10 Apr) Domingo
Cavallo stated that decisions about economic
growth "are decided by private businessmen
while government just creates an atmosphere of
legal security and economic stability to allow
profiting from opportunities."
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too extreme by many policy makers.92
While Chile is now the success story of
Latin America, that country's strong
economic performance was achieved at
substantial cost, as unilateral tariff
reductions led to significant dislocations.
From 1973 to 1990, the number of poor in
Chile doubled to nearly 43% of the
population as a result of the country's open
market policies."-^
A more moderate course than
unilateral tariff reductions was to engage
in regional integration. Since the
competition from other developing
countries within a trade bloc is not as stiff
as from the rest of the world, becoming
competitive within the bloc was seen as
being less disruptive than unilateral tariff
reductions would be. Ironically, whereas
regional economic integration was once
used to promote import substitution, now
it is touted as mechanism to move in
exactly the opposite direction — the
promotion of exports. Many Third World
countries hope that regional integration
can be a stepping to stone to inserting
themselves more forcefully into the world
economy. According to Domingo Cavallo,
Argentina's Minister of the Economy,
Mercosur is engaging in integration "not to
isolate ourselves but to be prepared for an
opening and integration with the world
economy.""^ Policy makers are optimistic
that the efficiency of the Third World
economies will be improved through
92Cohen, Roger. "All Latins Should Try Chile's
Homemade Growth Recipe." Wall Street lournal .
September 30, 1988, p. 27.
9
^Ford, Peter. "Chile Struggles to Lift Burden of
Pinocet Years." Christian Science Monitor.
February 18, 1992, p.7.
94 FBI S- May 31 1990- (from Telam, 27 May)
promoting the growth of new industries
and the strengthening of older industries
that take advantage of the increased
market size of the region. After engaging
in competition and specialization within
the group, it is hoped that the economies
will be in a more favorable position with
the rest of the world.
The need for efficient industries is
also a reflection of a desire to emulate the
success of the newly industrialized
countries (NICs) in Asia, which have made
substantial improvements in their standard
of living by exporting manufactured
products to the rest of the world."5 Carlos
Menem, President of Argentina, stated that
"We cannot develop our region if we turn
our backs to the world around us. I am not
afraid to say that an appropriate
international economic insertion into the
world economy is essential for our own
economic development."^ While many
countries that advocate regional
integration, such as Brazil and Singapore,
are already significant global exporters, it
is hoped that the integration process will
make their companies even more
internationally competitive.
Finally, the willingness to engage in
economic integration is also a reflection of
a markedly changed attitude towards the
formation of trade policy. Until recently,
many trade policies in the Third World
had been designed primarily for
9
^Haggard, Stephen. Pathways from the
Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly
Industrializing Countries . 1986. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
96FBIS. 1 April 1991 (Asuncion Red Nacional de
Television 26 Mar)
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macroeconomic reasons."' Trade was
viewed statically, in that policy makers
looked at the level of trade that existed at
one moment and examined how this level
of trade could be best manipulated to
achieve other economic goals. In the past,
when faced with balance of payments
difficulties, the main course of action had
been to limit imports. For instance, in the
early 1970s, in order promote the balance
of payments in the face of the first energy
crisis, Brazil raised tariffs, eventually to
prohibitive levels, on imports that it
designated as "superfluous." Now,
however, there has been a substantial
change of thinking and this method of
preventing a foreign exchange crisis is now
regarded as having been a drain on the
Third World's development. Trade is now
seen less as a way of promoting domestic
economic stability than as something that
is important in itself. Recognizing that
programs which limited imports led to
highly inefficient companies, Third World
policy makers now prefer to increase
exports in order to earn more foreign
exchange and improve the balance of
payments.
Developing Country
Integration Efforts Initiated in
the 1990s
In response to the rise of economic
regionalism in the industrialized world
and the concurrent need to move away
from import substitution, there have been
a large number of Third World regional
integration arrangements initiated in the
1990s. This section will provide a very
brief description of the range of integration
efforts that have emerged.
The integration schemes that have
been proposed among Third World
countries can be classified into three basic
categories. The first set of integration
agreements consists of those trade blocs
which have so far made substantial
progress in reducing tariff barriers, namely
the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and the
Southern Cone Common Market
(Mercosur). The second group of trade
blocs is made up of several integration
agreement which include both developing
and industrialized countries. None of
these agreements have made any
substantial progress towards reducing
trade barriers, however, and two of them
are actually not much more than
proposals. The third set of agreements is
distinguished from the second group in
that all of the members of these proposed
trade blocs are developing countries.
Some of these groups are not new, but are
instead attempts to reinvigorate older
integration attempts, such as the Andean
Pact, CARICOM and the Central American
Common Market, which failed in the 1960s
and 1970s. As with the second group, the
trade blocs which comprise this third set
have also not progressed very far beyond
the negotiation stage. Each of the trade
blocs within these three categories are
briefly summarized below.
*7Coes, Donald V. Brazilian Trade Policy and
Regional Trade Initiatives (unpublished), p. 30.
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Third World Integration Agreements
That Have Made Substantial Process
Mercosur
The governments of Brazil,
Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay on
March 26, 1991 signed the Treaty of
Asuncion, creating the Southern Cone
Common Market (Mercosur). The aim of
Mercosur is to create a regional common
market by the end of 1994, encompassing
more than 200 million people with an
aggregate GDP of more than $500
billion.9° Mercosur is a very substantial
agreement, with the most far-reaching
goals and the most concrete results so far
of any regional integration plan in the
Third World.
Mercosur aims to completely
eliminate tariffs in less than three and a
half years, using a graduated schedule of
tariff reductions.^ Tariffs on intra-
regional trade were reduced by 47% on
November 30, 1991 and are then to be
reduced every six months afterwards, until
all tariffs are reduced to zero by the end of
1994. Significantly, all the reduction
deadlines have been met through April
1993, resulting in tariff cuts of 75%. 100
Not all products within Mercosur
were initially subject to tariff cuts,
however, as each country was allowed to
specify a number of industries that it
wished to have to be exempted from the
reduction program. These exemptions are
only temporary, though, and are subject to
their own reduction program. Argentina
and Brazil are to reduce the list of
industries granted exemptions by 20% per
year, until all exemptions have been
removed by the end of 1994. Paraguay and
Uruguay will follow a similar schedule,
but are given one extra year to eliminate
their exemptions. 101
To prevent the distortions that are
caused by disparities in tariff levels,
Mercosur also aims to establish in 1995 a
common level of protection for goods
originating outside of the group. The
common external tariff will be 20% for
most goods, and 35% for a smaller number
of sensitive industries. Significantly, tariffs
on this smaller list are scheduled to be
reduced from 35% to 20% over the period
1995 to 2001. 102
Under the Treaty of Asuncion's
binational investment provision, firms
with majority control by citizens of
Mercosur will be treated as domestic
industries in all four countries. Binational
firms will therefore have access to official
credit instruments, to government
incentives or subsidies, and will compete
equally with domestic firms for
government contracts. 103 While this
provision does not apply to firms with
majority foreign control, Mercosur also
established a relatively low local-content
rule (50%) that should be a significant
incentive for MNCs to invest in the region.
98Latin American Weekly Report. April 4, 1991,
p.l.
"Annex 1, Article 3 of the Treaty of Asuncion
""Latin American Regional Reports: Brazil .
March 18, 1993, p. 6.
^Article 3 of the Treaty of Asuncion
^Latin American Regional Reports:Southern
Cone Report. February 4, 1993, p. 4.
lO^Tavares, jose Mercosur and the Bush
Initiative , (unpublished).
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The Treaty of Asuncion also calls
for coordination of fiscal and monetary
policies, in order to minimize trade
imbalances which are not the result of
changes in comparative advantage. Unlike
the other components of Mercosur,
however, there has not been any effective
progress in this area, and it will be difficult
for this policy goal to be achieved in the
foreseeable future.
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement
In January 1992, the leaders of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) signed agreements which created
the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
AFTA creates a trade area that aggregates
the economies of Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and
Brunei, which combined represent more
than 330 million people and a GNP of over
$300 billion dollars. AFTA aims to reduce
tariffs to between and 5% over the next
fifteen years on all products currently
traded in the region, with the exceptions of
unprocessed agricultural goods and
services. In total, the products included in
the agreement account for 87% of ASEAN's
total trade.
Tariffs will be reduced according to
the CEPT (Common Effective Preferential
Tariff) agreement. Beginning on January 1,
1993, tariffs on most CEPT products will be
reduced to a maximum of 20% over the
next five to eight years. After tariffs have
been reduced to 20% or lower, over the
next seven years they will be further
reduced to 0-5% by the year 2008.
Countries will be required to announce in
advance the schedule that they will follow
to meet both sets of tariff targets. Other
quantitative restrictions, such as quotas, as
well as non-tariff barriers, will also be
eliminated under the agreement.
Fifteen sectors of products were
placed on an accelerated schedule of tariff
reduction under the CEPT. The fifteen
sectors are: vegetable oils, cement,
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, fertilizer,
rubber products, leather products, pulp,
textiles, ceramic and glass products, gems
and jewelry, copper cathodes, electronics,
wooden and rattan furniture. Tariffs on
these products will be reduced below 5%
within seven years if rates are presently
less than 20%, and within 10 years if tariffs
are currently above 20%.
A number of goods, accounting for
approximately 6% of ASEAN's intra-
regional trade, have been temporarily
excluded from AFTA. After eight years,
this list will be re-examined to determine
whether those products still warrant
exclusion from the agreement. AFTA only
allows for exclusions at the sector level,
which are broad categories encompassing
many similar goods, rather than at the
specific good level. Because it is more
difficult to exclude entire sectors of goods
than it is to exclude individual goods, it is
hoped that this sector approach will keep
most products within AFTA.
Apart from product exclusions
which are agreed upon by all the countries,
a country can also unilaterally cancel tariff
reductions on products which "cause or
threaten to cause serious injury" to
domestic industries. The definition of
"serious injury" and the length of time that
products can be excluded under this clause
are not delineated in the agreement.
Importantly, under the "Six Minus X"
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provision, if a country does decide to opt
out of CEPT tariff reductions for a product
because of '"serious injury," this will not in
any way preclude other countries from
lowering their tariffs on this product. If
the rest of the ASEAN countries wish to
have free trade in this product, then they
can proceed with tariff reductions. In
addition, states which wish to enter into bi-
or multi-lateral tariff reduction agreements
with other members will be permitted to
do so.
In order to monitor the
implementation of AFTA, the Secretary
General of ASEAN will now be selected on
merit rather than being rotated amongst
the countries. The office itself has been
imbued with much greater power and
responsibility. Furthermore, the
bureaucracy has been streamlined by
reducing the number of committees which
will oversee economic cooperation from
five to one. The annual meeting of
economic ministers in October will
continue, and the leaders of ASEAN will
now hold a summit every three years.
Recognizing that economic
cooperation involves more than simply a
reduction of tariffs, ASEAN requires states
to increase cooperation in five areas:
energy, transportation/communications,
finance, trade and agriculture. In addition,
the Framework Agreement requires states
to increase cooperation in technology
transfer, research and development,
tourism, and human resource
development. However, no specific
measures for increasing cooperation in
these areas were proposed in the
Framework Agreement.
Economic Integration Proposals
Involving both Third and First World
Countries
Enterprisefor the Americas Initiative
On June 27 1990, the President Bush
announced the creation Enterprise for the
American Initiative (EAI). The proposal
contains three sub-components relating to
trade, investment, and debt relief.104 With
regard to trade, the EAI proposes to create
a free trade area encompassing the entire
Western Hemisphere. In the second area,
the EAI will create an investment fund for
the region to promote the competitiveness
of private business. This fund, initially
valued at $1.5 billion, is to be administered
by the Inter-American Development Bank.
The third component proposes to write off
a portion of Latin America's debt that is
held by the US government. To qualify for
this debt reduction, Latin American
countries will be required to implement
environmental protection programs. 105
Many policy makers in Latin
American felt that the debt-relief portion of
the EAI was not substantial enough. 106
According to the initial terms of the
proposal, only $5 billion of the $12 billion
debt to the US government would be
written off. This accounts for a mere 1.2%
104porter, Roger B. "The Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative: A New Approach to
Economic Growth." lournal of Interamerican
Studies and World Affairs. Winter 1990, p. 7.
^"Sylvia Saborio. "Small Change: The
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative Promises
Official Debt Reduction." Latin Finance . No. 25,
p. 22
^"Interview with Maria Dakolias, World Bank,
Sept. 17, 1992.
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of the region's $423 billion external
debt. 107 It is likely, therefore, that the
debt-relief proposal was important only for
its symbolic value, in that it demonstrated
that the United States was trying to find
new ways to deal with the debt problem.
Similarly, not much attention
within Latin America was directed
towards the investment fund element of
the EAI. While the goals of the investment
fund were lauded, the small size of the
fund seemed to guarantee that its impact
would be limited. In addition, the limited
scope of the fund's activities, in that it is
specifically targeted towards the
promotion of certain kinds of private
sector activity, was seen as insufficient to
meet many of the region's most pressing
demands. Both physical and human
capital infrastructural improvements were
to receive no assistance under the Bush
administration's initial proposal. 10"
The portion of the proposal which
has received the most attention is the idea
of a hemispheric free trade area. Within
Latin America, leaders rushed to offer
strong endorsements of this proposal.
Soon afterwards, numerous official
conferences and meetings were sponsored
by Latin governments in order to explore
the ramifications of the proposal. Many
Latin American governments, including
Chile, Argentina, Colombia and
Venezuela, offered strong pronouncements
of their desire to become members of the
EAI.1°9
Twenty nine Latin American
countries have signed Framework
Agreements with the United States to
explore the possibility of joining the
EAI. 110 To qualify for membership,
countries must meet a number of criteria:
1. protection of intellectual property; 2.
reduction of government subsidies; 3.
elimination foreign exchange controls; 4.
opening markets to service industries; and
5. reduction of barriers to foreign
investment. 111 So far, the only country
which has met the EAI's criteria is Chile.
As a result, Chile has been negotiating
with the United States on establishing a
free trade area between those two
countries. 11 -^ However, a decision to
proceed with Chile-US free trade has been
put on hold until Mexico has formally been
incorporated into NAFTA. Other countries
that might meet the EAI's criteria at some
point are Columbia, Venezuela, and
Argentina. 11 3
Interestingly, however, the United
States has made clear that it hopes the EAI
will promote the establishment of regional
107Saborio. p. 22
•^Graham, Carol. "The Enterprise for tine
Americas Initiative: A Development Strategy for
Latin America?" Brookings Review, vol. 9, no. 4
(Fall 1991.)
1(
-'"Chrisrian, Shirley. "Bush's Offer of Free
Trade Gets Warm Latin Reception." New York
Times, 26 August 1990, p. 15A.
1
^Sidney Weintraub. "Making Regionalism
Work." Latin Finance, No. 25, p. 49
^de la Torre, Augusto and Margaret R. Kelly.
Regional Trade Agreements . 1992. Washington:
International Monetary Fund, p. 7.
H^Goshko, John M. "Bush Picks Chile for Free-
Trade Pact Negotiations." Washington Post,
May 14, 1992, p.24.
^^Interview with Randolph L. Mye, Regional
Coordinator for Southern Cone Countries at the
U.S. Department of Commerce. Conducted in
Washington D.C. on 19 September, 1992.
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integration schemes within Latin America.
While the United States is willing to
proceed with negotiations for
incorporating Chile into the EAI, in many
ways Chile is in a select category. For the
remainder of Latin America, the US
government has expressed a clear
preference for negotiating with trade blocs
rather than individual countries.1^ An
example of this is the 'Four Plus One'
agreement signed between the members of
the Southern Cone Common Market
(Mercosur) and the United States.^ 5
While the 'Four Plus One' agreement offers
little more than vague platitudes such as
"promoting free trade" and "increasing
economic ties", it is symbolic of the
approach that the United States wishes to
take.
After making the proposal, the
United States nevertheless assumed a very
muted stance towards the EAI. While
interest in Latin America for the proposal
has remained high, very little was made of
the proposal in the United States. Two
reasons may account for U.S. ambivalence.
First, the attention of U.S. policy makers
has been focused on successfully
concluding the negotiations to made
Mexico party to the US-Canada Free Trade
agreement. Second, the United States
made this proposal at the height its conflict
with the European Community in the
GATT negotiations. It is very likely that
EAI was proposed largely as a bargaining
1
^Interview with John Huenemann, Office of
the United States Trade Representative.
Interview conducted in Washington D.C. on 15
September 1992.
115Auerbach, Stuart. "US Signs Pact on South
American Trade." Washington Post. 20 June
1991, p. 9.
chip in the negotiations with the EC; as a
means of demonstrating that the United
States would not settle for an
unsatisfactory conclusion to the Uruguay
round. As a result, while the EAI could
someday eventuate in a hemispheric free
trade area, for the moment it is little more
than a proposal.
East Asian Economic Caucus
On December 7, 1990, Prime
Minister Mahathir of Malaysia proposed
the East Asian Economic Grouping
(EAEG). Mahathir envisioned the EAEG
as a trade bloc which would include Japan,
China, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand,
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Indonesia.
Mahathir felt that if North America
and Europe turned inwards and put up
protectionist walls against Asian goods,
that it would be necessary to find other
markets for Asian goods. Mahathir saw
the most logical replacement of the
European and North American markets as
being Asia itself. Despite the region's
booming economies, intra-regional trade
was still minor compared to the Europe or
North America. Mahathir felt that the
formation of a regional grouping would
substantially boost trade within the region,
possibly to the point of offsetting any loss
of markets elsewhere in the world.
Mahathir also felt that such a powerful and
diversified economic grouping would have
a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis the
EEC and NAFTA, whereas separately each
Asian country, even Japan, would have
difficulty during negotiations with such
powerful economies.
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Mahathir envisioned Japan as being
the leader of the grouping. Because of
Japan's vast foreign investments in the
region and because of its massive financial
wealth, he hoped that Tokyo would be able
to play a role similar to Germany's in the
EEC. With Japan's extremely prosperous
citizens, Japan would also be a key market
for Asian goods, hopefully reducing the
region's reliance on the European and
North American markets.
Mahathir's plan was endorsed by
several Asian governments. *® However,
the United States strongly condemned the
EAEG as an attempt to cut the United
States off from Asia. The United States
firmly renounced any trade bloc in Asia in
which it was not included. As a result of
American opposition, Japan did not
support the group because it did not want
to jeopardize trade relations with its most
important trading partner. South Korea,
the second largest economy in the EAEG,
also did not endorse the group out of fear
of provoking the ire of the United States.
Other countries, such as Indonesia,
disliked the confrontational tone of the
EAEG and were afraid of anything which
might jeopardize access to the massive
American market.^^
In October 1991, Mahathir decided
to change the EAEG to the EAEC (East
Asia Economic Caucus). Although the
EAEG was originally envisaged as a trade
bloc, Mahathir later changed his
conception of the group's purpose to that
of discussing regional trade issues and
presenting a common front in international
negotiations. The change in name from the
EAEG to the EAEC was done in order to
underline the fact that the group was no
longer intended to be a trade bloc.
Mahathir hoped that if the group was not
seen as a trade bloc, the apprehensions of
the US would be assuaged and Japan and
South Korea would be able to endorse the
idea. 118
The US was still upset by the plan,
however, even after the change to the
EAEC. Consequently, Japan and South
Korea still demurred from joining the
group. Because of the reluctance of Japan
to join the group, many other Asian
countries were reluctant to endorse the
proposal. While Mahathir continues to
press ahead with the idea, it is unlikely
that the agreement will proceed. 1^
North American Free Trade Agreement
In June 1990, the Presidents of
Mexico and the United States agreed to
begin negotiations on a free trade
agreement between their two countries.
The United States had previously initiated
at free trade agreement with Canada in
1989. At first, it was thought that the US
would have concurrent accords with
Mexico and the Canada, but that these
latter two countries would not have any
direct agreement between them. One year
later, however, Canada entered the
negotiations between Mexico and the
United States, in order to create a North
American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). Such an accord would produce
116Asian Wall Street lournal . January 28, 1992,
p.l
117Asian Economic News [KyodoJ, Jan. 20, 1992
^Asian Economic News . Jan. 24, 1992
^"
Far East Economic Review February 6, p. 10
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a market of nearly 360 million people and a
combined GNP of almost 6 trillion
dollars.120121 The formal agreement was
finally completed in August 1992, after
nearly fourteen months of intense
negotiations. In November 1993, after
intense political struggle with Congress,
President Clinton was successful in
ratifying the agreement.
The agreement is extremely
complex and comprises more than one
thousand pages of text. The treaty aims for
a free trade area to be implemented
starting in 1994. Tariffs and other barriers
to trade on both goods and services are
scheduled to be eliminated over a fifteen
year period. The treaty contained
important provisions to resolve disputes
between the group's members, protect
intellectual property rights, deal with
government procurement, and remove all
impediments to investment. In response to
substantial challenges by labor and
environmental organizations, President
Clinton vowed not to approve NAFTA
until new safeguard agreements with
Mexico were negotiated. These
agreements seek to ensure that US workers
are protected against significant
displacements, that companies in Mexico
do not have an advantage because of lax
labor and safety laws, and that the
environment, especially along the US-
Mexican border, does not deteriorate as a
result of the agreement. These agreements
proved difficult to negotiate, however, and
their combined impact was not capable of
mollifying the agreement's critics.
Mexico saw access to the United
States as a crucial element in its drive to
reform its economy. Since his election,
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has
undertaken a dramatic program to increase
the efficiency of Mexico. He has pushed
through a program of substantial
privatization of state-owned industries,
vast reductions in tariff rates, and the
elimination of many barriers to foreign
investment. In response, the government's
fiscal deficit was improved tremendously,
which led to a concomitant reduction in
inflation rates. As a reward for Mexico's
commitment to reform, the country was
able to reschedule a substantial portion of
its external debt. Salinas saw free trade
with the United States as a means of
furthering the development of
manufactured goods suitable for export.
Exports to the United States have
comprised a substantial portion of the
growth in the Mexican economy in recent
years. As a result, about two-thirds of
Mexico's exports are currently sent to the
United States. Salinas also NAFTA as a
means of attracting foreign investment
which sought to take advantage of access
to the US market.
Canada would not likely have
pursued free trade with Mexico had the
United States not pushed ahead with the
concept. There is very little direct trade
between these two countries, totaling a
mere $2 billion in total trade during
1989.122 Nevertheless, the Canadian
government thought it was much more
preferable to have a direct say in the
negotiations, in order to try and influence
120Far East Economi r Review February 6, p. 10
121 Latin American Weekly Report. March 11,
1993, p. 112. 122Hufbauer and Schott , p. 4
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any tariff reduction agreement into
something more preferable to its interests.
The United States saw NAFTA as a
means of consolidating the reforms that
had occurred in Mexico in the last several
years. In 1987, Mexican tariffs averaged
more than 100%, whereas they are less
than 20% today. That reduction has led to
a huge increase in exports from the United
States, from $12 billion in 1987 to $28
billion in 1992. 123
Embryonic Integration Proposals Among
Developing Countries
Andean Pact
In November 1991, the Andean
Group decided to once again attempt to
eliminate intra-regional tariffs. The fear o\
trade diversion caused by free trade
between Mexico and the United States
seems to have been the primary reason for
the re-establishment of the trade pact. The
group set the end of 1992 as the deadline
establishment for a free trade area, and
1995 as the date for a common market. A
common external tariff was to be
implemented by Colombia, Peru and
Venezuela in 1993, and Ecuador and
Bolivia in 1995. 124
Significant problems developed,
however, over plans to enact the common
external tariff. Bolivia and Peru argued for
a very low level of protection, while the
^Latin Finance. No. 35, p. 44
^Kenneth N. Frankel and Thomas Vega-
Byrnes. "Changing Focus: The Andean Pact
Embraces Foreign Investment." Latin Finance.
Vol. 35, p. 42
remaining members were in favor of a
higher common tariff rate. 125 This dispute
led to a disruption of progress on other
matters, including exemption lists for tariff
reductions, common customs procedures,
and the problem of export subsidies.
Further difficulties developed as a
result of the coup by Alberto Fujimori in
Peru on April 5, 1992. Venezuela promptly
severed all relations with Peru, in keeping
with Venezuela's policy of not recognizing
any government which is formed using
unconstitutional means. In response, Peru
protested Venezuela's decision by voting
against all of the measures before the
Andean Pact's June 17, 1992 meeting. As
decisions in the Andean Pact are made by
consensus, Peru's intransigence posed
significant obstacles to implementing the
group's goals. In August 1992, Peru
decided to withdraw temporarily from the
Andean Pact. 126
Another problem with the Andean
Pact concerns the status of Bolivia. It is
very likely that Bolivia will leave the
Andean Pact in order join the Southern
Cone Common Market (Mercosur), since a
far higher percentage of Bolivia's trade is
with the members of Mercosur than the
Andean Pact. Bolivia also hopes to benefit
from the increase in infrastructure
coordination that is occurring as a result of
Mercosur.
The fracturing of the Andean Pact
has heightened further by Venezuela and
Colombia's bilateral decision to completely
eliminate tariffs between them beginning
l^Latin America Weekly Report . January 14,
1993, p. 11.
i-6>Peru Blocs Andean Group's Great Leap.
Latin American Weekly Report . June 235, 1992.
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January 1992.127 77^5 decision made
sense, as most of the trade within the
Andean Pact is between these two
countries. Venezuela and Colombia
therefore seem to be splitting off from the
rest of the group, especially in light of the
formation of the Group of Three.128 At
this point, therefore, it does not seem likely
that the Andean Pact will proceed.
Chile and Mexico
Chile and Mexico are currently
pursuing very similar economic policies.
Both have significantly reduced restrictions
on imports into their economies, have a
strong emphasis on fiscal discipline, and
are at the vanguard in terms of promoting
competition within their economies. As a
result, it is not surprising that in September
1991 these two countries signed
agreements to substantially reduce trade
barriers between themselves.
According to the agreement, tariffs
on approximately 90% of goods traded
between the two countries are to be
eliminated by 1995. Tariffs in another
eight product areas, including
petrochemicals, will be eliminated by 1998,
and trade barriers on cars will start to be
reduced in 1996. The agreement also
called for the immediate elimination of all
non-tariff barriers between the two
countries. In addition, accords have been
signed on harmonizing investment rules.
Significantly, the agreement has already
begun to be implemented. Implementation
has proven to be relatively easy because as
countries have already been reducing
tariffs on a unilateral basis. 129
It is significant that both of these
countries are viewed very positively by the
United States as trading partners. The
United States has already concluded free
trade negotiations with Mexico and has
indicated that Chile is next in line for
preferential trade status. As a result, it is
not likely that the United States will
directly negotiate with the Chile-Mexico
trade pact. Nevertheless, a de facto free
trade agreement could eventually between
this bloc and the United States were
individual treaties signed with both
countries.
Caribbean Common Market
In 1990, the members of CARICOM
agreed to once again attempt to establish a
common market within the region.
International events, most notably the
United States' decision to enter into free
trade negotiations with Mexico, seem to
have been the main precipitating factor for
the group's decision. A deadline of
January 1, 1994 was set to accomplish the
goal of eliminating barriers to trade within
the region. In addition to the reduction of
tariff barriers, the group aims to
implement a common external tariff and
eliminate all non-tariff barriers.1™
The group even aimed to establish
a common currency for the region by the
127Big Two Pre-Empt Andean Summit. Latin
American Weekly Rpport February 13, 1992.
12°Frankel and Byrnps . p. 42
129de la Torre and Kelly , p. 10
130de la Torre, Augusto and Margaret R. Kelly.
Regional Trade Agreements . 1992. Washington:
International Monetary Fund, p. 10.
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middle of 1992. Jamaica's decision to
liberalize its exchange market made
attempts to move in the direction of a
common currency virtually impossible. As
a result, the goal of a common currency
was pushed ahead indefinitely."1
Some progress has been made on
reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
However, progress on establishing a
common external tariff has proven to be
particularly elusive. Five of the countries
in the group missed both the first and a
subsequent deadline for reaching this goal.
As a result, the 1994 target of establishing a
common market is highly unlikely.
Central American Common Market
In June 1990, the Central American
Common Market (CACM) renewed their
efforts to reduce barriers to trade within
the region. The group's goal was to
implement a free trade area by the end of
1992. The group's rebirth was made
possible largely because there were no
longer any substantial political barriers to
integration, as relations between Honduras
and El Salvador had improved and the rule
of the Sandinistas had ended in Nicaragua.
The group's membership was expanded, as
Panama was added to the five original
countries within the agreement.
After the impasse in the GATT
negotiations, the six members began to
draw up plans for establishing a common
market."2 \n June 1992, the group was
able to decide upon regulations with
respect to rules of origin and a common
customs form was agreed upon. However,
the timetable for reducing tariffs on intra-
regional trade was delayed and the group
failed to reach any agreement on a
common external tariff."3 in general, El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have
been more eager to engage in liberalization
than the remaining three countries in the
group.
Despite the difficulties of achieving
free trade within their own region, the
members of CACM decided in February
1992 to begin discussions with the
members of CARICOM, in hopes of
forming a larger, Caribbean Basin free
trade agreement. Belize, which is a
member of CARICOM, now attends all of
the meetings of CACM as an observer, and
may end up as the link between these two
trade groups. 134
Columbia, Mexico and Venezuela
The two most prosperous members
of the Andean Pact, Columbia and
Venezuela, decided to initiate negotiations
with Mexico in early 1989 towards forming
a free trade agreement. Subsequent
negotiations proved successful, and the so-
called Group of Three was initiated."5
The original goal was to create a free trade
l^Caricom Gets Stuck Over Common Tariff.
Latin American Regional Reports : Special
Report: Free Trade and Common Markets, June
1992.
132de la Torre and Kelly , pp. 7, 10.
^^Latin American Regional Reports : Special
Report: Free Trade and Common Markets, June
1992.
l^Latin American Regional Reports : Special
Report: Free Trade and Common Markets, June
1992.
l^Step Backwards on Common Tariff. Latin
American Weekly Report , January 9, 1992.
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between the three countries by the end of
1993.
Significantly, Mexico and
Venezuela already cooperate extensively
on energy issues. Both are parties to the
San Jose agreement, which assists
Caribbean Basin countries in purchasing
petroleum. Growing out of cooperation in
this area, the three countries initiated an
ambitious plan for linking the region with
gas pipelines.^"
The 1993 goal of creating a free
trade agreement was postponed, however,
because of severe political problems in
Venezuela, including two coup attempts.
In addition, Columbia decided to
transform its trade policy, which diverted
attention in that country away from the
Group of Three. Nevertheless, the
prospect of a free trade area being formed
between these three countries appears
promising, largely because they have very
consonant views on trade and investment
issues and they are also at similar levels of
development.
Because Columbia and Venezuela
are members of the Andean Pact,
negotiations were conducted on making
the Group of Three compatible with the
Andean Pact. In the end, Mexico agreed
that any tariff concessions that it granted to
these two countries it would also extend to
the remaining members of the Andean
Pact. As a result, should the Andean Pact
proceed, then a de facto free trade
agreement could come to exist between
that agreement's members and Mexico. 1*7
Evaluating Mercosur and
AFTA
Mercosur and AFTA are the only
two developing country integration efforts
that are worthwhile assessing at this
juncture, as they are the most advanced in
terms of both their structures and results
achieved so far. In addition to being the
farthest along, Mercosur and AFTA are
also the two largest Third World trade
pacts, and therefore have the most
significance to the global economy.
In this section, both Mercosur and
AFTA will be evaluated according to how
successfully they have avoided each of the
underlying structural deficiencies that
were identified as having led to the
downfall of integration efforts during the
1960s and 1970s.
Product Coverage and the Process of
Tariff Reductions & Exemptions
Mercosur
With respect to product coverage,
Mercosur is superior to previous Third
World integration efforts. Instead of
having tariff cuts only on certain products,
the reductions in Mercosur are being
conducted across the board. In addition,
136Delayed Startup for Northern Axis. Latin
American Regional RpporK: Special Report: Free
Trade and Common Markets, June 1992.
l^Latin American Regional Reports : Special
Report: Free Trade and Common Markets, June
1992.
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rather than basing reductions on periodic
negotiations, Mercosur includes a
"gradual, direct and automatic program"
for the complete elimination of tariffs.^8
The moment the treaty was put into
practice, tariffs were reduced by 47 per
cent They will be reduced by 7 per cent
every six months afterwards, until all
tariffs are reduced to zero by the end of
1994. It is highly advantageous to prevent
countries from designing their own
program of tariff cuts, as it greatly reduces
the political difficulties of reductions.
Because countries and firms in Mercosur
know that delays will not be granted, they
have focused their efforts on complying
with the reduction targets rather than
lobbying to avoid them. Significantly,
there have been no delays in the tariff
reduction program through April 1993.
Equally significant is the fact that
all exemptions to the tariff reduction
process within Mercosur have been
granted only temporarily. At the outset of
the Treaty of Asuncion, each country
established a list of industries that would
not immediately be subject to tariff cuts. In
order to ensure that these exemptions are
only temporary, the lists of products are
subject to their own reduction program.
Argentina and Brazil are to reduce the list
of industries granted exemptions by 20%
per year, until all exemptions have been
removed by the end of 1994. Paraguay and
Uruguay will follow a similar schedule,
but have until 1995 to completely reduce
their lists of exempted products. Each of
the targets for reducing exemption lists
have been achieved by all of the four
countries.
138Amex \ t Article 3 of tine Treaty of Asuncion
AFTA
Product coverage within ASEAN is
less ambitious than within Mercosur, but it
is still an improvement upon previous
Third World integration efforts. In total,
over 38,308 products are currently
scheduled for tariff reductions,
encompassing 87% of ASEAN's total trade.
Only 7% of ASEAN's trade, namely
services and unprocessed agricultural
goods, were permanently excluded from
tariff reductions. An additional 3,839
items, accounting for 6% of ASEAN's
trade, were temporarily excluded from the
agreement. However, this temporary list
will be reviewed after eight years, to
determine whether these products still
warrant exclusion from the agreement.
Significantly, fifteen sectors of goods were
selected for accelerated tariff reductions
under the CEPT. The amount of intra-
regional trade in these fifteen sectors
accounts for 24.7% of ASEAN's total intra-
regional trade. Thus, even if AFTA were to
go no further than this accelerated list, a
very large amount of trade will have been
liberalized.
Product coverage was also
immeasurably improved as a result of the
"6 minus X" provision in the Framework
Agreement. In ASEAN's previous attempt
at increasing intra-regional trade, the
Preferential Tariff Agreement (PTA),
decisions about which products to include
in the agreement were made by consensus.
Consequently, if one country strenuously
objected to a certain product being
included in the agreement, that one
country could normally prevent all the
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other ASEAN countries from reaping the
benefits of freer trade in that particular
product. ASEAN's leaders recognized that
using consensus to determine which
products were included in the agreement
was a severe hindrance to reducing
barriers on intra-regional trade.
Consequently, under the "Six Minus X"
provision, member states can opt out of
reducing tariffs on a particular product if
they are not yet ready. However, in opting
out of reducing tariffs on that product, this
will not preclude other countries from
lowering their tariffs on this product.
In addition to the positive
characteristics mentioned above, there are
a number of significant problems with
AFTA's tariff reduction program, however.
In marked contrast to Mercosur, AFTA
does not have a fixed schedule of tariff
reductions. Instead, ASEAN countries are
free to set their own tariff reduction
program."9 Because the tariff deadlines
within AFTA are so far in the future, there
is great danger that countries will delay
reductions. The risk that countries will fail
to reduce tariffs enough is particularly
strong because there is no supra-national
authority with binding power. While the
ministerial-level Council is responsible for
monitoring whether countries are
complying with the agreement's terms, it
does not have any powers of enforcement.
Richard Lipsey argues that the
combination of no fixed schedule of tariff
reduction and AFTA's lack of enforcement
means "there would seem to be little to
prevent individual ASEAN countries from
delaying tariff cuts if they chose to. "140
139Straits Times. January 13, 1993, p. 36
140Business Times
. January 13, 1993, p. 3
Probably the most damaging clause
within AFTA is that which allows
members to keep tariffs at their current
levels on products whose importation
causes or threatens to cause "serious
injury" to domestic industries. A
significant deficiency of the agreement is
that there is no definition as to what
constitutes "serious injury". In addition,
allowing countries to forego tariff
reductions on items merely where they
fear "serious injury" is also a major
problem, since exemptions would be
extremely easy to justify. Furthermore,
there is no limit to the number of products
that countries can unilaterally exclude in
this manner. The Malaysian government
has supposedly compiled a list of
thousands of products that firms in
Malaysia wish to be excluded from AFTA.
In an extreme reaction, a Filipino
commission studying AFTA has
recommended that the Manila government
reverse the exclusion process, by listing
products to be included in AFTA rather
than outlining products to be excluded
from the agreement.^!
A key question will be whether
countries will be allowed to keep tariffs on
products which cause "serious injury"
indefinitely, or whether it will be a
temporary exclusion which will merely
give extra time for readjustment of
extremely sensitive industries. Once
exclusions have been established, there
will be tremendous political pressure for
them to be maintained. If ASEAN does not
take a very firm stance on the question of
exclusions, then the agreement will not
progress expeditiously.
141 Inter Press Service [Manila], July 20, 1992
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Uneven Levels of Development and
Inequitable Gains from Integration
Mercosur
Within Mercosur, there is a clear
bifurcation between the large,
industrialized economies of Brazil and
Argentina and the vastly smaller and less
competitive economies of Uruguay and
Paraguay. As will be seen, however, this
differential will not likely have a
deleterious effect upon the progress of
Mercosur, as these two smaller countries
joined Mercosur with a vastly different set
of expectations compared to the less
developed countries that were members of
integration efforts in the 1960s and 1970s.
A large portion of Uruguay's
economy consists of industries that have
grown uncompetitive behind high
protectionist barriers. Consequently, the
government was not very keen about
opening up its market to imports from
Brazil and Argentina, as this could lead to
severe dislocations. Before the creation of
Mercosur, Uruguay had substantial trade
agreements with both Argentina and
Brazil, guaranteeing virtually free access to
these two markets, and did not therefore
see any need to engage in liberalization
with these two countries. *42 However, the
seriousness of the approach towards
integration pursued by Argentina and
142With Argentina, Uruguay had the CAUCE
(Argentine-Uruguayan Convention for
Economic Cooperation), which essentially
exempted Uruguayan products from all barriers
into the Argentinian market. Similarly, Uruguay
signed the PEC (Commercial Expansion
Program), which enabled extremely preferential
access to the Brazilian market.
Brazil caused the Uruguayan government
to fear that if an agreement was concluded,
that the bilateral treaties that it had with
the two countries would be greatly
vitiated, if not actually superseded, thereby
imperiling access to these two crucial
markets, which account for 33% of
Uruguay's external trade. 14 3
The Paraguayan government felt
similarly threatened that any preferential
access that it had would be greatly diluted
were Argentina and Brazil to proceed with
bilateral liberalization efforts. This was of
substantial concern, since nearly 53% of
Paraguay's trade is with these two
countries. While Paraguay did not
especially want to have its economy
become more specialized at this time, the
decision to join Mercosur was relatively
easy, since it has had a de facto open
economy for some time. Even though
Paraguay's ostensible tariffs were until
recently very high, rampant smuggling
into the economy meant that there were in
practice no real barriers to imports, which
ensured that no industries developed
behind huge protectionist walls. Most of
the industries within Paraguay are
therefore a reflection of its natural
comparative advantages. Thus, it will
likely not face substantial adjustment costs
as Uruguay does, and might actually
benefit from increased access to larger
markets.144
No significant programs will be
implemented to assist Paraguay and
Uruguay. Both countries were given an
extra year to comply with the tariff
reduction program and were allowed to
l^Inter-American Development Bank
^Interview vvith Maria Dakolias, World Bank.
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have a much larger list of temporary
exemptions from tariff reductions."5 in
comparison to previous integration efforts,
however, the special treatment accorded
Paraguay and Uruguay is much less
extensive, as there are no special funds or
programs to assist their development.
Mercosur's lack of specific aid to
these countries should be seen as an
important strength of the agreement.
Paraguay and Uruguay are not expecting
their economic plight to improve because
of economic assistance from the more
developed members of Mercosur. As a
result, these two countries will be much
more likely to adapt their economies to
regional integration rather than wait for
preferences. In addition, the role of the
state in the economies of Paraguay and
Uruguay is diminished relative to the past.
Consequently, these countries do not
require as much direct government aid, as
a substantial amount of assistance can be
provided through private capital markets
directly to businessmen rather than
through the government.
It would appear, therefore, that
Uruguay and Paraguay are proceeding
with Mercosur largely for defensive
reasons. They do not expect marked
improvements in trade as a result of
integration, rather they felt that if they did
not proceed with the agreement that they
would lose some of the current trade. As a
result, Mercosur will likely not suffer the
same fate as many previous integration
efforts, where the smaller, less developed
countries became resentful due to
insufficient benefits from integration.
^Articles 6 and 7 of Annex 1 of the Treaty of
Asuncion
Because of the circumstances under which
they joined, Paraguay and Uruguay will
probably not attempt to delay Mercosur's
implementation even if they do not gain
substantially from the agreement.
AFTA
Like Mercosur, the members of
AFTA are at different stages of economic
competitiveness. Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand have grown rapidly in the last
decade, and now have the ability to
manufacture a wide range of goods which
are very competitive internationally.
Brunei has not yet experienced spectacular
growth, but does not fear the effects of
foreign competition because of its high
level of income from oil exports. Indonesia
has grown rapidly in the last few years as
well, but its goods are not as competitive
as in these first three countries. The
Philippines, in contrast to the rest of
ASEAN, is economically stagnant and its
industries are very uncompetitive. In
marked contrast to Mercosur, this disparity
in competitiveness threatens to have a
significant negative impact on the scope
and speed of liberalization efforts.
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and
Brunei are all in favor of quick
implementation of AFTA. Singapore and
Brunei have everything to gain from
AFTA, since their markets are already
predominantly open. Malaysia is eager for
AFTA because its industries are
competitive. Malaysia already sends 24%
of its exports to ASEAN countries, a
number which it hopes can grow even
larger. Thailand has a number of export
industries that are very competitive, and
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therefore has much to gain as a result of
lower tariffs within ASEAN.
In contrast to these first four
countries, Indonesia is fearful of AFTA,
and was the main force in lengthening the
implementation of the agreement from 10
to 15 years. Indonesia, which has by far
the largest market in the group, was afraid
that it would be deluged by imports from
other ASEAN countries which were more
economically advanced. Indonesia's recent
economic growth has been based on
exports, but not to other countries within
ASEAN. Indonesia sends only 10.8% of its
exports to other ASEAN countries, which
is the second lowest percentage in the
group. As a result, Indonesia feels that
they have much to lose by AFTA, and
pushed for the adoption of the clause
which allows countries to stop tariff
liberalization of products whose
importation causes "serious injury" to
domestic industries.
The Philippines has even greater
concerns about AFTA than Indonesia. The
Filipino economy is by far the weakest in
the group, and its goods are the least
competitive. Protected behind very high
tariffs, many Filipino industries have
become very bloated. The Philippines
exports only 5.3% of its exports to ASEAN
countries, by far the lowest percentage of
any ASEAN country. Like Indonesia, it
fears that its inefficient domestic industries
will be overwhelmed by foreign
competition. Because its political situation
is far less stable than in Indonesia, it is
likely that the Filipino government will
respond to the political pressure from
industries which will suffer as a result of
lower tariffs. Consequently, the
Philippines will probably be the country
which exerts the most braking power on
AFTA.
ASEAN has not yet been
implemented any program for assisting the
relatively less competitive members of
AFTA. Nevertheless, the position of
Indonesia and the Philippines suggests
that the continued implementation of the
agreement may become contingent upon
assurances that they will not suffer
egregiously as a result of their membership
in AFTA. Anticipating this development,
the Sultan of Brunei has in fact proposed
that their should be sharing of the costs
and benefits of AFTA in light of the
differences in the levels of development
within ASEAN. 146 The experiences of
previous integration efforts indicate that
ASEAN would be wise not to
inappropriately raise the expectations of
their less prosperous members through
promises of regional assistance.
High and Divergent Tariff Structures
Mercosur
In the last few years, tariffs within
all of the Mercosur countries have been
declining, helping to reduce the factors
inhibiting integration which are associated
with high, divergent tariff schedules.
Argentina substantially reduced its tariff
rates in April, 1991. The Argentinian
government replaced its previous,
complicated tariff structure with a simple,
three-tiered plan; finished goods will have
tariff rates of 22%, intermediate goods will
be at 11%, and foods and inputs that are
146Bernama. January 27, 1992.
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not produced in Argentina will not face
any tariffs whatsoever.* 4 ' As a result,
Argentinian tariff rates are now less than
10% on average. Soon after Argentina's
action, Uruguay enacted a very similar
tariff schedule. Brazil has also initiated a
substantial process of tariff reductions, in
order to reverse the protectionist policies
of the 1970s. During that period, Brazil
raised tariffs, eventually to prohibitive
levels, on imports that it designated as
"superfluous." In 1991, Brazil's tariffs were
as high as 80% on many products. For the
last two years, Brazil has met each of its
tariff reduction targets. Tariff cuts are
scheduled to continue until the average
level of protection is reduced to 187o by the
end of 1994.148 Paraguay has had a de
facto open economy for some time. Even
though Paraguay's ostensible tariffs were
until recently very high, rampant
smuggling into the economy meant that
there were in practice no real barriers to
imports.
Progress towards a common
external tariff was aided immeasurably by
the fact that the tariff structures of the
Mercosur countries are becoming more
complementary. Mercosur has made
substantial improvements over previous
integration efforts with regard to the
establishment of a common external tariff.
At first, it appeared that only lip-service
was being paid to the need for a common
barrier to the rest of the world, as the
treaty merely stated that a common
external tariff would be established
147FBIS 5 March 1991 (Buenos Aires HERALD, 2
Mar, p. 7)
148FBIS 2 Oct. 1991 (Gazeta Mercantil, 28 Aug.,
p. 6)
eventually, while nothing was mentioned
about how this process was to proceed.
At the Las Lenas summit in June
1992, however, negotiations were initiated
to establish the level of common external
protection. A few months later, a common
tariff level of 20% was agreed upon for
most products, starting in June 1993. A
smaller number of goods, most notably
computers, will have a common rate of
35%. Significantly, tariffs on this smaller
list are scheduled to be reduced from 35
per cent to 20 per cent over the period 1995
to 2001. 149
AFTA
A very important factor working in
favor of AFTA is that most of the leaders of
ASEAN have committed themselves to
tariff liberalization. Considering the fact
that most of their economies are based on
exports, the ASEAN leaders know that
they must remain internationally
competitive lest their country's prosperity
be threatened. Even in the absence of the
rise of economic regionalism, the countries
of ASEAN likely would have felt
inexorable pressure to lower their tariffs to
ensure that their exports remain globally
competitive.
It is significant that a number of
countries were proceeding with
liberalization strategies even before AFTA.
Former Prime Minister Anand of Thailand
pointed out that "most of us have been
liberalizing our tariff and import regimes.
We are now better equipped then ever
* 4^Latin American Regional Reports , 4 February
1993, p. 4. Southern Cone Report.
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before to move towards a higher plane of
ASEAN economic cooperation." In June
1991, Indonesia dramatically lowered its
tariffs and barriers to foreign
investment. 150 The average tariffs on
goods imported into Indonesia is now
(20%). For the past few years, Malaysia
has been lowering its barriers to foreign
goods, and now has an average tariff rate
of only (9%). 1^1 Thailand, which before
AFTA had the highest tariff levels within
ASEAN, announced immediately after the
Singapore summit that it would
unilaterally reduce tariffs faster than the
agreement calls for. Thai tariffs on more
than 1,000 ASEAN goods were reduced to
30% on Feb. 16, 1993. 152 Singapore and
Brunei do not need to substantially reduce
their tariffs to comply with AFTA, since
they have de facto free trade already. In
fact, at the beginning of 1993, Singapore
completely eliminated tariffs on all
ASEAN imported products, thereby
fulfilling its commitment to AFTA fifteen
years ahead of schedule. 53 yhe
Philippines is the clear laggard in terms of
tariff reduction. Before AFTA they had the
second highest tariff levels within ASEAN,
and there is no sign that they wish to
engage in dramatic reductions in the near
future. With the other countries heading
towards liberalization, however, there may
be increased pressure for the Philippines to
open its markets.
Thus, while there is still a high
degree of divergence of tariff structures
150 Far East Economic Review. June 13, 1991,
pp. 73-4
l 51 The Nation. January 22, 1992, pp. Al, A2
^Business Times [Singapore], January 1, 1993
l 53Straits Times. January 1, 1993, p. 47
within ASEAN, the overall trend is highly
encouraging. Nevertheless, in marked
contrast to Mercosur, the leaders of
ASEAN have not made the establishment
of a common external tariff a policy goal.
The Framework Agreement did not even
mention the possibility that a common
external tariff might be established at some
point in the future. While some analysts
and policy makers argued that a common
external tariff would be necessary in order
for ASEAN to fully benefit from tariff
liberalization, the leaders of ASEAN have




Regional economic planning failed
in previous integration efforts because too
much was attempted with regard to
regional development, while insufficient
attention was paid to macro-economic
coordination. The architects of Mercosur
have wisely attempted to reverse this
concentration.
In marked contrast to previous
integration efforts, the members of
Mercosur are striving to make the private
sector, and not the government, the
primary force behind integration. In the
1960s and 1970s, regional trade pacts
assigned industries to certain countries in
order to strengthen import substitution,
which was a government sponsored
economic policy. Governments sought to
alter the economy directly in order to
foster prosperity, and it was hoped that the
private sector would cooperate with that
Regional Economic Integration 48
process. This time, however, the Mercosur
governments are trying, according to
Domingo Cavallo, merely to "create an
atmosphere.. .to allow profiting from
opportunities."^^ Mercosur's more de-
centralized process of integration should
prove to be far more dynamic and
economically rewarding than was the
slow, politicized procedure of regional
development planning.
Although Mercosur's position with
respect to harmonization of economic
policies is an improvement over previous
integration attempts, it remains only a
marginal one. The framers of Mercosur
recognized the need to coordinate
economic policies in order for the
agreement to proceed expeditiously. Fiscal
policy coordination was seen as important
to prevent significant differentiation in the
levels of economic growth between
countries in the region. Most importantly,
the need to control the oscillation of
exchange rates was deemed imperative in
order to foster stable trading patterns and
avoid artificial trade imbalances. Exchange
rates in the region over the past twenty
years have gyrated wildly, and the
uncertainty stemming from this has had a
severe impact on the level of trade.
Exchange rates have been particularly
unstable due to the plethora of exchange
rate controls the countries have adopted to
protect their balance of payments. *55
The need for macro-economic
policy coordination is amply demonstrated
by the current situation in Brazil, which is
in a deep recession and is concurrently
experiencing hyper-inflation. Brazil
currently has a marked trade advantage
over its Mercosur partners, as exchange
rates are artificially low and Brazilian
producers have excess capacity which they
are willing to sell abroad at very low
prices. As a result, Brazil is currently
running a massive trade surplus with
Argentina, which has led to a substantial
decrease in the popularity of Mercosur
within Argentina and placed great strain
on the agreement. Despite the pressing
need for some degree of economic policy
coordination, as yet there has been
virtually no progress in this area
whatsoever. Proposals on how macro-
economic coordination might be attempted
will not even be finished until December
1993.156 as m is is only one year before
full coordination was originally scheduled,
it is evident that Mercosur will fall far
short of the goals of the Treaty of Asuncion
in this area.
AFTA
In its original attempt at economic
integration, ASEAN placed a heavy
emphasis on regional development
planning. Under the ASEAN Industrial
Projects (AIP) program, countries were to
be granted comparative advantage within
the region in five specific industries, with
equity jointly held by the members of
ASEAN. While great efforts were made
towards establishing regional comparative
advantage, the group was one of only a
few integration schemes which did not
have the establishment of a common
154 FBIS. 11 April 1991 (TELAM, 10 April 1991)
155javares p i6 156FBIS. 29 June 1992. (TELAM, 27 June 1992.)
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external tariff or macro-economic
coordination as a policy goal.
While ASEAN has abandoned the
goal of regional development planning in
its current integration proposal, the group
has retained its dislike of other forms of
regional economic planning. In the VTA,
the group did not attempt to establish a
common external tariff or coordinate
macro-economic policies because of
substantial differences in the levels of
development, the region's tariff structures,
and strategies of economic development.
While the group's development strategies
and tariff structures have become much
more complementary in recent years,
movement towards regional economic
planning will continue to be constrained
by the divergent levels of development.
Both the more developed and the less
developed countries would likely be hurt
more than they would gain as a result of
any kind of merging of their economic
policies.
The low commitment to regional
economic planning is also a reflection oi
the pace of tariff reductions within AFTA.
Mercosur has already reduced tariffs
significantly, and there is consequently a
strong need for macro-economic
coordination and a common external tariff
in order to prevent imbalances. In
contrast, AFTA's tariff reductions will not
take effect for a number of years. As a
result, there is no danger of imbalances
and inefficiencies of the sort that currently
exist between Brazil and Argentina. Once
tariff reductions eventually commence,
regional economic planning may become a
more pressing issue within AFTA.
Military Rule and Regional Rivalries
Mercosur
At the start of the 1980s, all of the
Mercosur countries were ruled by military
dictatorships. In 1983, Argentina became
the first country in the region to re-
establish democratic government, followed
by Uruguay in the next year, then Brazil in
1985, and finally Paraguay in 1989. This
dramatic democratic transformation has
reduced security tensions within the region
substantially, thereby eliminating an
important obstacle to integration.
The lessening of security tensions
between Brazil and Argentina has been
particularly marked and important. Until
1985, Brazil and Argentina saw each other
as their primary security threat, and
competed for regional hegemony. With
the return to democracy, these two
countries have replaced their former
enmity with pledges of cooperation. Both
Argentina and Brazil actually see
integration as a means of strengthening
their political ties in order to move beyond
their tradition of mutual suspicion. Each
hope that integration will highlight the
benefits of cooperation between the two
countries, and will increase the perception
of each other as partners rather than rivals.
The new attitudes between these
two countries is reflected in several recent
policy iniatives. There has been substantial
cooperation between Argentina and Brazil
with regard to nuclear weapons. In order
to end their nuclear rivalry, a number of
important accords were signed between
the two countries, notably an agreement on
July 18 which prohibits "the testing, use or
production of any type of nuclear
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weapon. "157 j assure that nuclear
programs would only be used for peaceful
purposes, each country was granted
unrestricted access to the other's nuclear
facilities. In addition, Brazil and Argentina
are considering merging some aspects of
their diplomatic activity. Already, the two
countries have united their positions with
respect to the development of nuclear
energy, and actually alternate representing
each other at the International Atomic
Energy Agency. There is also discussion of
eventually having a unified consulate or
even a single ambassador in more than 30
countries.158
AFTA
Within Mercosur, there are no
territorial disputes, the member countries
do not look askance at each other's military
capabilities, and there is little concern
about intra-regional security. In marked
contrast, the countries of ASEAN have not
yet resolved their intra-regional security
concerns. The move towards democracy
within ASEAN has not had the same
salutary effects upon regional tensions as
within Mercosur. This is largely because
the roots of the disputes within ASEAN
have less to do with the role of the military
in politics, but are instead attributable to
historical, cultural, and geographic factors.
While ASEAN countries are not hostile
towards each other, their suspicious
attitudes towards each other will likely
prove to be a significant restriction on
integration efforts.
There are currently a number of
significant border disputes within ASEAN.
Just before the Singapore summit which
initiated AFTA, Thailand and Malaysia
engaged in negotiations regarding their
borders. A dispute arose because
uniformed Thai soldiers entered into
Malaysian territory once in July 1990 and
four times in December 1990. After the
talks between the two countries, Prime
Minister Mahathir of Malaysia released a
statement that "Thailand has agreed that it
will not resort to provocative acts and will
have discussions with Malaysia on any
problem relating to territory. "159 ^ this
time, Mahathir also held discussions with
President Suharto of Indonesia over
borders, specifically over the Sipadan and
Ligitan Islands that Indonesia claims. In
another dispute, Malaysia and Singapore
are currently contesting sovereignty over
Pedra Branca islands. 160 Perhaps the most
serious cause of enmity within ASEAN is
the Spratly islands, an area with
potentially rich deposits of oil and gas
claimed wholly or in part by Brunei,
Malaysia, the Philippines, China, Vietnam,
and Taiwan. Discussions over the Spratlys
dominated the ASEAN foreign ministers'
meeting in July 1992. * 6
1
In addition, there
are significant frictions caused by
differences in Thai and Indonesian policies
towards Cambodia. While none of these
disputes threatens to lead to hostilities,
their presence in an indication of the
l"Larin American Weekly Reports . 1 August
1991, p.4.
158 FBIS. 16 Sept. 1991 (Gazeta Mercantil, 17-19
Aug., pp. 1,3)
159Bernama. January 26, 1992.
^International Defense Review. August 1992,
p.732
161 Straits Times. September 9, 1992
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suspicious attitude that ASEAN's members
have towards each other. That defense
budgets within the region are rising at a
very rapid pace does not bode well for
AFTA.
Non-Tariff Barriers
The other three Mercosur members charge
that Brazilian companies enjoy artificially
low prices for inputs such as steel, gas and
electricity. 1°4 In addition, formal
complaints have been lodged against
Brazil for subsidizing exporters by under-
writing the difference between the very
high domestic interest rates and the lower
ones that exist abroad. *"5
Mercosur
Mercosur is an improvement over
most previous developing country
integration efforts, in that the need to deal
with the problem of NTBs was recognized.
Under the terms of the Mercosur
agreement, "all nontariff restrictions will be
lifted within the common market" by the
end of 1994.162 However, as the
experience of the Andean Pact
demonstrates, it is not enough merely to
issue a blanket elimination of NTBs.
Mercosur has not yet enumerated the
specific administrative practices that are to
be eliminated.
The most important NTB that
Mercosur has not dealt with sufficiently is
export promotion. While Mercosur
agreement stated that standards would be
established in relation to export promotion,
the working group assigned to this task
has not yet drawn up any specific
recommendations. 163 As a result, there
are already a number of grievances within
Mercosur with regard to excessive
subsidization, mostly directed at Brazil.
AFTA
Much like Mercosur, while the
AFTA agreement states that non-tariff
barriers will be eliminated, there is
nevertheless no specific provision to reach
that end. As a result, progress in reducing
tariffs threatens to be undermined by an
increase in the importance of informal
barriers to trade. Tensions within ASEAN
could begin to accumulate until a means is
devised to assure each of the members that
their companies are on an equal footing
with competitors in the rest of the region.
Export promotion policies do not
have the same degree of importance within
ASEAN as they do within Mercosur.
Instead, product standards are the most
important kind of NTB which AFTA must
deal with. Without common health, safety
and other standards, then trade flows
within ASEAN could be greatly disrupted.
Product standards vary greatly within
ASEAN largely as a result of the large
l"2Annex ] / Article 10 of the Treaty of Asuncion
163FB1S 29 June, 1992. (TELAM, 27 June 1992.)
The negotiators working in tine area of export
promotion are scheduled to suhmit their final
report in Septemher, 1993.
164
^a tin American Regional Reports, 10
September 1992, Southern Cone Report, p. 4
l"^Latin American Regional Reports
, Special
Report: Free Trade and Common Markets, June
1992, p. 4
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disparities in the levels of development
within the region.
Because new kinds of barriers may
be created to replace the proscribed
procedures, the AFTA agreement will have
to be flexible enough to incorporate these
new practices. ASEAN will also have to
establish the necessary mechanisms to
ensure that countries are in compliance
with the terms of the agreement. Because
many countries in the region do not have
well-trained bureaucracies, the ASEAN
Secretariat may have assume some part of
the enforcement process in this area.
Regional Infrastructure Development
Mercosur
The progress of Mercosur has been
furthered because there now exists a
substantial degree of cooperation with
regard to regional infrastructure
development. While many of these
projects are occurring independently of
Mercosur, the agreement's existence has
provided significant support for expanding
linkages within the region.
Improving the ease of
transportation within the region is
currently a top priority of the leaders of the
Southern Cone. The governments of
Argentina and Uruguay plan to construct a
$ 1 billion, 30 mile bridge across the La
Plata River, linking the city of Colonia in
Uruguay to Buenos Aires. This bridge
would reduce the travel distance between
Montevideo and Buenos Aires by 170
miles.16° There is also great interest in
promoting the Southern Cone Highway
System, in order to expedite the transport
of goods between the four countries.167
Plans have been drawn for a $2.5 billion,
1,500 mile expressway along the Atlantic
Ocean, which would link Sao Paulo with
the capitals of Argentina and Uruguay.
Bidding is expected to be completed in
1994, and construction to start in 1995. 168
Regulations are also being eased on the
transport of goods along the Parana-
Paraguay rivers, in order to allow
agricultural goods from Paraguay and
southern Brazil to be transported to the sea
at substantially reduced costs. There is
also discussion of opening of national air
space to airlines with the flag of the four
countries.169 Most important, however, is
the Hydrovia project, a plan to make the
Parana and Paraguay rivers navigable for
the entire year, as opposed to the current
three months. The Hydrovia would open
to farming and commerce huge sections of
the four countries, especially in Paraguay
and Brazil, which are currently
undeveloped.
There is a very substantial amount
of regional cooperation on energy issues,
the most notable being the Itaipu Dam,
which has been run jointly by Paraguay
and Brazil since 1982. Energy accords have
also been signed by the Paraguayan and
Argentinian Presidents. It is hoped that
Argentina will supply Paraguay with oil,
oil by-products, and liquefied petroleum
gas, while Paraguay will supply Argentina
166
EB1S, 30 Dec. 1991 (Telam, 27 Dec. 91
)
167 FBIS. 30 Dec. 1991 (Telam, 27 Dec. 91)
^Financial Times. 4 November 1992, p. 8
169 FBIS. 16 Sept. 1991 (Gazeta Mercantil, 17-19
Aug., pp. 1,3)
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with electricity.170 On August 17, 1992 the
state oil companies of Argentina and Brazil
agreed to begin construction on a $10
billion gas pipeline from northern
Argentina to Sao Paulo. To accomplish
this, a "consortium will be set up between
the two state enterprises and private
partners to explore for gas and oil, run a
refinery, and build the pipeline."171 Other
issues of energy integration that are
discussed include studying the possibility
of shared use of electric power from the
Parana, Paraguay and Uruguay rivers,
interconnecting the Itaipu dam with the
Uruguayan-Argentine hydroelectric station
at Salto Grande, and the construction of a
joint Argentine-Paraguayan power station
at Yacrieta. 17^
A number of proposals have been
advanced to enhance the communications
links between the four countries. Brazil's
minister of infrastructure, Joao Santana,
proposed that a Brazilian satellite be
launched that would serve all of
Mercosur's members. Another proposal
that has been made is to have the postal
services of the four countries be
integrated. 17^ The four countries are
currently investing over $100 million in a
fiber optic network for easier
communication. Cellular phone calls will
also now be possible between the four
countries within Mercosur. 17^
17 FBIS. 31 Dec. 90 (Ultima Hora, 28 Dec.)
*'* Latin American Weekly Report , Sept. 3,
1992., p. 3
^FBIfUeSept. 1991 (Gazeta Mercantil, 17-19
Aug., pp. 1,3)
^Gazeta Mercantil . 6 Aug. '91, p.6
174FBIS. 29 June 1992, (Buenos Aires Herlad, 26
June 1992, p.ll)
AFTA
The framers of AFTA recognized
that promoting regional infrastructural
development was very important to
ensuring that the agreement was fully
successful. As a result, the agreement calls
for increased cooperation in a broad range
of areas, rather than concentrating solely
on trade. The Framework agreement states
that the members of ASEAN will increase
cooperation in five areas: trade, energy,
agriculture,
transportation /communications and
finance. In addition, the AFTA treaty
requires member states to promote
linkages with regard to the transfer of
technology, research and development,
tourism, and human resource
development.
Although it is significant that
ASEAN recognizes that the creation of a
regional economy will involve more than
the reduction of tariffs, the Framework
agreement nevertheless contains no
specific recommendation for increasing
cooperation in these areas. As a result,
there are no concrete regional projects of
the sort that are presently underway in
Mercosur. In this respect, ASEAN is not
any different from integration efforts in the
1960s and 1970s, as they also established
expansive goals for cooperating in non-
economic areas but rarely achieved any
tangible results.
It will be more difficult for ASEAN
to achieve progress in this area than it will
be for Mercosur, as there is less impetus
towards regional cooperation. It is
important to understand that the regional
coordination would probably proceed even
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in the absence of the Treaty of Asuncion.
Much more so than in the past, geographic
propinquity is having a strong positive
impact on the policies of countries within
the Southern Cone towards their
neighbors, as they now see it as being in
their national self-interest to work
together. In contrast, the members of
ASEAN do not yet have any strong forces
independent of AFTA pushing them
towards infrastructural coordination.
Conclusion
Regional economic integration is a
phenomenon which has dramatically re-
emerged in the developing world, with
more than ten proposals having been
advanced during the last three years. With
the multitude of proposals that have been
advanced, there is a need for a framework
which is capable of assessing the potential
of each of these agreements. Through an
examination of eight integration attempts
from the 1960s and 1970s, this study
sought to identify the most important
factors that affect the efficacy of regional
integration efforts in the Third World.
Only two case studies- Mercosur
and AFTA- were examined using this
evaluative framework. As yet, these are
the only two developing country trade
pacts that are at an advanced enough stage
to warrant a detailed evaluation. Several
conclusions can be drawn from the
analysis of these two trade blocs. First, it is
evident that neither Mercosur nor AFTA
have avoided all of the structural
deficiencies that plagued integration
efforts in the 1960s and 1970s. Both
Mercosur and AFTA are insufficient in
several important areas, namely the
elimination of non-tariff barriers and
regional economic planning. However,
Mercosur and AFTA have both made a
number of important gains vis-a-vis
previous integration efforts. Both
agreements are superior to the past with
regard to the degree of product coverage
and in terms of making their tariff
structures more compatible. Overall,
however, it is clear that Mercosur has
succeeded to a much greater degree than
has AFTA. Specifically, there are four
areas where only Mercosur, and not AFTA,
has avoided the structural problems that
plagued previous integration efforts,
namely the promotion of regional
infrastructure development, the scope and
process of tariff reductions, regional
security tensions, and mitigating the effects
of different levels of development within
the group. On this basis, it would
therefore seem that Mercosur is much
more likely to succeed than is AFTA. The
experiences of these two trade pacts in the
last few years, where Mercosur has already
reduced barriers to intra -regional trade by
more than 61% whereas AFTA has not yet
begun to reduce tariffs, seems to confirm
this evaluation.
Although the structure and terms
of Mercosur are an improvement over past
regional trade pacts, this is not to say that
the agreement is guaranteed success.
There are a number of unpredictable
problems that could plague Mercosur
which are completely independent of the
particular terms of the agreement,
including chronic trade imbalances,
potential deterioration of political relations
and, most notably, Brazil's ongoing
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political and economic instability.
Problems such as these have the potential
to derail even the most carefully written
plan for economic integration. It is
nevertheless evident that the framers of
Mercosur should be commended for
having avoided most of the problems
associated with regional integration which
were within their power to control. The
progress of Mercosur during the next few
years should provide an interesting test of
the applicability of the evaluative
framework developed in this study for
assessing other developing country
integration schemes.
Selected Bibliography
Ariff, Mohamed and Hal Hill. Export-
Oriented Industrialization: The ASEAN
Experience . 1985. Sydney: Allen and
Unwin.
Asian Wall Street Journal . [Various
Issues.]
Avery, William P. and James D. Cochrane.
"Innovation in Latin American
Regionalism: The Andean Common
Market." International Organization ,
Spring 1973
Baer, Wener. The Economics of Prebisch
and ECLA . Economic Development and
Cultural Change, January 1962.
Baer, Wener. Import Substitution and
Industrialization in Latin America:
Experiences and Interpretations . Latin
American Research Review, Spring 1972.
Bernama . [Various Issues.]
Blejer, Mario. Regional Integration in Latin
America: Experience an Outlook . Journal
of International Economic Integration,
Autumn 1988, vol. 3, no. 2.
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor G. "The Central
American Common Market." In
International Economic Integration edited
by Ali M. El-Agraa. 1988. London:
Macmillan Press.
Business Times . [Various Issues.]
Cardoso, Fernando and Enzo Faletto.
Dependency and Development in Latin
America . 1979. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Carranza, Mario E. Regional Security and
Economic Integration in Latin America and
Regional Economic Integration 56
Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study
(unpublished).
Coes, Donald V. Brazilian Trade Policy
and Regional Trade Initiatives
(unpublished).
Cooper, C. and Massell. "A New Look at
Customs Union Theory." Economic
Journal, vol. 75, 1965.
de la Torre, Augusto and Margaret R.
Kelly. Regional Trade Agreements . 1992.
Washington: International Monetary Fund.
Demas, William and Jasper Scotland.
"Experiences in Regional Cooperation: The
Case of the Carribbean Community and
Common Market (CARICOM)." In
Regional Integration: the Latin American
Experience edited by by Altaf Gauhar.
1985. London: Third World Foundation.
dos Santos, Theotonio. "The Structure of
Dependence." American Economic
Review . Vol. 60.1970.
Edwards, S. and M. Savastano. "Latin
America's Intra-regional Trade: Evolution
and Future Prospects." In Economic
Aspects of Regional Trading Agreements
edited by D. Greenaway. 1989. New York:
New York University Press.
El-Agraa, Ali M., ed. International
Economic Integration . London: Macmillan
Press, 1988.
Ezenwe, Uze. ECOWAS and the Economic
Integration of West Africa . 1983. London:
C. Hurst & Co.




Foreign Broadcast Information Service
(FBIS) . [Various Issues.]
Gambari, Ibrahim. Political and
Comparative Dimensions of Regional
Integration . 1991. London: Humanities
Press Interntional.
Gauhar, Altof. Regional Integration: the
Latin American Experience . 1985.
London: Third World Foundation.
Gazeta Mercantil . [Various Issues.]
Greenaway, D.T., Hyclack, T. and
Thornton, R.J. (eds). Economic Aspects of
Regional Trading Agreements . 1989. New
York: New York University Press.
Haas, Ernst B. and Phillipe Schmitter. The
Politics of Latin American Economic
Integration . Monograph Series in World
Affairs. 1965. Denver: University of
Denver.
Haggard, Stephen. Pathways from the
Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the
Newly Industrializing Countries . 1986.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hall, Kenneth O. "The Carribean
Community." In International Economic
Integration edited by Ali M. El-Agraa.
1988. London: Macmillan Press.
Hani, M. Bani. "Obstacles to Arab
Economic Integration." In The Problems of
Arab Economic Development and
Integration edited by Adda Guecioueur.
1984. Boulder: Westview.
Hirschmann, Albert. "Ideologies of
Development in Latin America", in Latin
American Issues: Essays and Comments .
1961. New York: Twentieth Century Fund,
p. 15.
57 Stephen G. Brooks
Hojman, D.E. "The Andean Pact: Failure of
a Model of Economic Integration?" lournal
of Common Market Studies , vol. 20, no. 2,
1981.
Hufbauer, Gary and Jeffrey Schott. North
American Free Trade: Issues and
Recommendations. 1992. Washington:
Institute for International Economics
Lipsey, R. and Lancaster, K. "The General
Theory of Second Best" Review of
Economic Studies . Vol. 24, 1956-7.
Makdishi, Samir. "Arab Economic
Cooperation: Implications for the Arab
World." In Arab Industrialization and
Economic Integration edited by Roberto
Aliboni. 1979. London: Croom Helm.
Inter Press Service [Various Issues.]
Inter-American Development Bank.
Economic and Social Progress in Latin
America: Economic Integration . 1984.
Washington: Inter-American Development
Bank.
Internationa] Defense Review . [Various
Issues.]
]eber, T.A. "The Relevance of Traditional
Integration Theory to Less Devioped
Countries", lournal of Common Market
Studies, vol. 9, no. 3(1971)
Kreinin, M. E. "On the Dynamic Effects of
a Customs Union." lournal of Political
Economy , vol. 72, no. 2 (1964)
Latin American Regional Reports: Brazil.
[Various issues.]
Manzetti, Luigi. "Argentine-Brazilian
Economic Integration: An Early
Appraisal." Latin American Research
Review . Vol. 25, No. 3.
Mayes, David G. 1978. "The Effects of
Economic Integration on Trade". Journal
of Common Market Studies, Vol. 1, No. 25.
Meade, J. The Theory of Customs Unions .
1955. Amsterdam, North Holland
Publishing Company.
Mitchell, Christopher. The Role of
Technocrats in Latin American Integration .
Inter-American Economic Affairs, Summer
1967.
Morawetz, David. The Andean Group: A
Case Study in Economic Integration among
Developing Countries . 1973. Cambridge:
The MIT Press.
Latin American Weekly Report . [Various
issues.]
Latin Finance . [Various issues.]
Lipsey, Richard. "The Theory of Customs
Unions: Trade Diversion and Welfare"
Economica. Vol. 24, February 1957.
Lipsey, R. "The Theory of Customs
Unions: A General Survey" Economic
lourna l. Vol. 70, September 1960.
Musrey, Alfred. An Arab Common
Market: Studies in Inter-Arab Trade
Relations, 1920-1967 . 1969. New York:
Praeger.
Penaherrera, Germanico. "The Andean
Pact: Problems and Perspectives." In
Regional Integration: The Latin American
Experience edited by Altaf Gauhar. 1985.
London: Third World Foundation.
Porter, Roger B. "The Enterprise for the
Americas Initiative: A New Approach to
Economic Growth." lournal of
Regional Economic Integration 58
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs ,
Winter 1990.
Rosenthal, Gert. "The Lessons of Economic
Integration in Latin America: The Case of
Central America" in Regional Integration:
the Latin American Experience edited by
by Altaf Gauhar. 1985. London: Third
World Foundation.
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phillipines,
Singapore and Thailand . 1979. London:
Macmillan Press.
Wong, J. "The Association of Southeast
Asian Nations." In International Economic
Integration edited by Ali M. El-Agraa.
1988. London: Macmillan Press.
Stern, Robert. "Evaluating Alternative
Tariff Cutting Formulae." lournal of World
Trade Law , January/February, 1976.
Straits Times . [Various Issues.]
Tan, Gerald. "Intra-ASEAN Trade
Liberalization: An Empirical Analysis"
lournal of Common Market Studies , June
1983.
Tavares, Jose. Mercosur and the Bush
Initiative . (Unpublished.)
Teitel, Simon. Economies of Scale and Size
of Plant: The Evidence and the
Implications for Developing Countries.
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.
13, 1975.
The Nation . [Various Issues.]
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development. Current Problems of
Economic Integration . 1986. New York:
United Nations.
Viner, Jacob. The Customs Union Issue .
1950. New York: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Wionczek, Miguel S. Economic
Cooperation in Latin America, Africa and
Asia . 1969. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press.
Wong, J. ASEAN Economies in
Perspective: A Comparative Study of
DISTRIBUTION LIST
No. of Copies
1. Dudley Knox Library 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
2. Research Office 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100





Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
5. Scott Tollefson 1
Assistant Professor
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgrdaduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
6. Stephen Brooks 10
Department of National Security Affairs
Naval Postgrdaduate School
Monterey, CA 93943
7. Western Hemisphere Division 1
AF/XOXXW PNT Room 3A 1064
Office of the Air Staff
Washington, DC 20330








10. Western Hemisphere Plans & Policy Branch
OP-613 PNT Room 4E5 19
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
11. Representative Robert G. Torricelli
Sub-committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
House Foreign Affairs Committee
705 O'Neilll House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
12. Director, Net Assessment
OSD/NA
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, D.C. 20501
13. Center for Naval Analyses
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302









United States Naval Academy
Annapolis, MD 21402
17. Library
United States Military Academy
West Point, NY 10996





Pentagon Room 3B5 16
Office of the Army Chief of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20310
20. Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Peace Corps Affairs
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
4446 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510-6225
21. Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade
U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C. 20510-6225
22. David Brown
Director for Regional Affairs
State Department, Room 5313
2201 C ST. NW
Washington, D.C. 20320
23. East/Asia Pacific Affairs Plan and Policy Branch
Pentagon, Room 4E475
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
24. Head, East Asia/Pacific Plan and Policy Branch
Pentagon, Room 4E475
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350
25. Office of the Secretary of Defense
Director, East Asia and Pacific Region
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155
26. Chief, Pacific East Asia Division
AF XOXXP, Pentagon Room 4D1034
Office of the Air Force Chief of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20301
27. Far East/South Asia Divsion
OJC5-JG Room 2E973
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20301
28. Far East Regional Desk
DAMO-SSM Room 3B545
Office of the Army Chief of Staff
Washington, D.C. 20310
29. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
707 O'Neill Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
30. Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs





3 2768 00347373 7
